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For 187 years, Indian nations status in the United 
States has not been fully developed or consistently approached 
within the law. They are viewed as Domestic Dependent 
Nations located within the geographical boundaries of the 
United States. Although Chief Justice John Marshall 
acknowledged that Indian nations had a certain amount of 
sovereignty, the exact extent of such sovereignty as well as the 
place of tribes within the federal system has remained ill-
defined. This Article examines what has been the role of the 
Supreme Court in integrating Indian nations as the third 
Sovereign within our federalist system. The Article 
accomplishes this task by examining the Court’s Indian law 
record in the last 30 years. The comprehensive survey of Indian 
law decisions indicates that while the tribal win-loss record at 
the Supreme Court is improving, the Court has had difficulties 
upholding the federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty 
and encouraging tribal self-government. 
 After categorizing the cases between victories and 
losses, the Article divides the cases into categories for 
analytical purposes. The Second half of the Article focuses on 
the interaction between the Court and Congress concerning the 
incorporation of tribes as the third sovereign within the 
federalist system, and ends by arguing that through its 
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disproportionate use of federal common law in its Indian law 
decisions, the Court has not attempted to reach a consensus 
with Congress about the place of Indian nations within our 
federalism.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1831, Indian nations have been viewed as 
Domestic Dependent Nations located within the geographical 
boundaries of the United States. 1   Chief Justice Marshall 
attributed that status to the fact that Indian tribes had signed 
treaties in which they acknowledged themselves to be under 
the protection of the United States, 2  the fact that Indian 
nations were understood to be within the geographical 
boundaries of the United States, 3  and the description of 
Indian nations as “tribes” and not “foreign nations” within the 
structure of the Constitution. 4   Although Chief Justice 
Marshall acknowledged that Indian nations had a certain 
amount of sovereignty,5 the exact extent of such sovereignty, 
as well as the place of tribes within the federal system, has 
remained ill-defined.  Although the Constitution arguably 
acknowledged the sovereign status of Indian Nations, 6 the 
                                                            
1 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Although this Article will 
use the terms “Indian nations” and “Indian tribes” interchangeably, the 
United States Constitution refers only to Indian “tribes.”  The use of the 
term “tribes” in the Constitution played a key role in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia where the Court held that Indian tribes were neither States of the 
Union nor foreign nations for the purpose of invoking the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. 
2 See Alex T. Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our 
Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 695 
(2006), and Alex T. Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the 
Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47, 70 (2004).  
3 Relying on the doctrine of discovery as enunciated in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
21 U.S. 543, 605 (1823).  
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause): “Congress shall 
have the power the power to regulate commerce among the States, with the 
foreign Nations, and with the Indian tribes”. 
5  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832) (stating that Indian nations 
had “territorial boundaries within which their authority is exclusive.”).  For 
an in-depth analysis of Justice Marshall’s opinion, see Philip P. Frickey, 
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV 381, 440 (1993).      
6  As stated by one scholar “[a]s a textual matter the Constitution does 
recognize tribal sovereignty in the Commerce Clause and the Treaty 
Clause.”  Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots between the Constitution, the 
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exact nature of that sovereignty is neither described nor 
protected in the Constitution.7   
Initially, the Supreme Court deferred questions 
concerning the status of Indian tribes within the political 
system of the United States to Congress, 8  whose policy 
towards Tribes changed with the times. 9   At first, Indian 
nations were viewed as political entities existing outside of the 
U.S. political system, and most of the relations between the 
United States and the Tribes were governed through 
treaties.10  Things began to change after 1871, when a law was 
enacted to prohibit the execution of any additional treaties 
with Indian nations. 11   Soon after, the United States 
embarked on a policy aimed at assimilating individual Indians 
into the mainstream American society. 12   There was no 
attempt to integrate Indian nations into the U.S. political 
system as sovereign governments, and the expectation was 
that Indian tribes, as political entities, would soon 
disappear.13  However, in the 1930s Congress changed course 
and made the decision to integrate tribes into the U.S. political 
system as quasi-sovereign entities.14  The current policy of the 
United States is to promote tribal self-determination and 
recognize Tribes as self-governing entities with enough 
                                                            
Marshall’s Trilogy, and Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 651, 
655–64 (2009).   
7 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“The Tribes, by contrast, are not part of this constitutional order, and their 
sovereignty is not guaranteed by it.”).   
8 See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886); Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (holding that congressional decisions in 
the management of tribal property was a political question). 
9 See Felix Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 23–108 (2012 ed.).  
10 See Vine Deloria Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of 
Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 979 (1996).   
11 Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 466 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. 71 (2000) (“No Indian nation of tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent 
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by 
treaty.”)  
12 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 71–79.  
13  See Kathryn E Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns: Tribes, Popular 
Originalism, and the Supreme Court, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 297 (2013).  
14 See Cohen, supra note 9, at 79–84.  
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sovereignty to have a government-to-government relationship 
with the United States.15  This Article examines the role of the 
Supreme Court in integrating Indian nations as the Third 
Sovereign within the U.S. federalist system.16   
Although the author has written about similar topics 
in the past, 17 this Article looks at the role of the Court by 
surveying and examining the Court’s Indian law record in the 
last thirty years.  The Supreme Court’s record of decided cases 
in the last thirty years indicates that the Court has had 
difficulties upholding the federal policy of respecting tribal 
sovereignty and encouraging tribal self-government.  In an 
influential article, David Getches documented that during the 
first fifteen terms of the Rehnquist Court, Indian tribal 
interests only won approximately twenty-three percent of 
federal Indian law cases at the Supreme Court from 1986 until 
2001.18  As the title of his article indicated, Getches believed 
that the dismal tribal record was influenced by the Court’s 
agenda to promote states’ rights, a color-blind agenda, and 
mainstream values.  
Getches’s findings were later supplemented by 
Matthew Fletcher who analyzed the Cert process at the 
Supreme Court and found that while very few tribal petitions 
were granted, a disproportionately large number of petitions 
filed by non-tribal interests aimed at overturning decisions 
favorable to these tribal interests were granted.19  In a more 
recent article, Bethany Berger updated the numbers found by 
Getches by looking at cases decided between 1990 and 2016.20  
                                                            
15  See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian 
Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121, 135–36 (2006). 
16 Describing Indian nations as “the Third Sovereign” may have originated 
with Justice O’Connor.  See Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the 
Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 6 (1997).  
17 See Skibine, supra note 2 
18 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of 
States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 267, 280–81 (2001). 
19 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process 
as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 981 (2009). 
20  Bethany Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1901, 1943 (2017) (Hereinafter “Hope for Indian Tribes”). 
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While confirming that the percentage of tribal wins from 1990 
until 2015 had not improved since Getches’s 2001 article, she 
saw an improvement in the 2015–2016 term that perhaps 
indicated that tribal interests could find some light at the end 
of this anti-tribal judicial tunnel.   
This article begins with an in-depth examination of the 
last thirty years of Indian law decisions. 21  Starting where 
Berger left off, after first categorizing the cases between 
victories and losses during this time, Part II divides the cases 
into four general areas within the field of federal Indian law: 
Political/Sovereign Rights, Economic Rights (treaty/property 
rights), Rights derived from the Indian trust doctrine, and 
Cultural/Religious Rights.  The cases are then further divided 
into four categories: federal common law, statutory 
interpretation, constitutional law, and procedural law.  
Appendix A lists all the cases in chronological order and also 
identifies the areas of law and the type of law used to decide 
each case.  Part II ends by assessing the trends in the 
evolution of the cases and concludes by formulating general 
principles that can be derived from the tribal win/loss record 
in these different classifications.  
Part III focuses on the dialectic between the Court and 
Congress concerning the incorporation of tribes as third 
sovereigns within the federalist system.  First, it evaluates 
Congress’s response to Supreme Court cases. Second, it 
examines at the Court’s response to congressional legislation.  
In a noted article, Philip Frickey and William Eskridge argued 
that when deciding cases, the Court evaluates what Congress 
and the executive branch think about the broader issues 
involved in such cases and responds accordingly, in effect 
trying to reach a legal “equilibrium” amongst the three 
branches of government.  As stated by the authors:  
 
Positive political theory claims that lawmaking 
institutions are rational, self-interested, 
                                                            
21 My survey starts with the 1987–1988 term and ends with the 2016–2017 
term.  For another survey, see Lawrence R. Baca, 40 Years of U.S. Supreme 
Court Indian Law Cases, 62 APR FED. LAW 18, 30 (2015) (listing all the cases 
from 1976 until 2014, classifying them as tribal victories or not, and 
commenting on the Justices who wrote some of the cases).   
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interdependent, and affected by the sequence of 
institutional interaction. When viewed through 
this lens, law is . . . an equilibrium, a state of 
balance among competing forces or institutions. 
Congress, the executive, and the courts engage 
in purposive behavior. Each branch seeks to 
promote its vision of the public interest… To 
achieve its goals, each branch also acts 
strategically, calibrating its actions in 
anticipation of how other institutions would 
respond.22 
 
Yet when it comes to federal Indian law, one has to wonder if 
the Supreme Court does not have another agenda.  One that 
does not try to reach an equilibrium with the other two 
branches of the government about incorporating tribes as the 
third sovereign within our federalism, but instead aims to 
impose the Court’s own terms for how Indian tribes should be 
integrated into the system.  
As asserted by Judith Resnick, when issues become 
important enough to the government, it will remind “the 
dominated group of its dependence upon the larger collective 
and works to bring the smaller group into compliance with 
federal norms.”23  Federal courts will impose federal rules of 
decisions on either state or tribal courts. 24  Although most 
tribes used to be isolated geographically and lacked the 
financial resources to have much of an impact on the non-
Indian world, their access has evolved in the last thirty years.  
Tribes are now meaningful actors, both economically and 
politically.  This could explain the Court’s new aggression in 
taking on Indian cases and, some may argue, judicial activism 
in modifying foundational principles that were established 
when Tribes were not much of a factor in the economic and 
                                                            
22 See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 28–29 (1994).  
23 Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes and the Federal 
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 756 (1989). 
24 Id. at 754 (stating that federal courts have allowed Tribes unrestricted 
authority on certain intra tribal issues such as tribal membership dispute 
because these “are not decisions of national importance.”)  
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political life of the United States.25  This may be the reason 
for what Frickey’s observation the Court was in the process of 
“flattening” federal Indian law into the broader American 
public law by importing general constitutional and sub-
constitutional value into the field.26  
Some scholars contend that Congress has relinquished 
its leading role in formulating federal Indian policy.27  Others 
argue that Congress is in fact much more active in enacting 
laws affecting or concerning Indian nations than previously 
thought. 28  Part III concludes by evaluating the role of the 
Court’s use of federal common law, arguing that the Court is 
not trying to reach an equilibrium with Congress but is 
looking for a different kind of equilibrium.  In other words, the 
Court is not attempting to achieve a balance between 
Congress and itself, but is aiming to establish what the Court 
perceives should be the proper equilibrium between tribal 
interests and the non-Indian/state interests.   
 
II. THE COURT’S RECORD IN THE LAST THIRTY 
YEARS.  
As reflected in Appendix A, the survey takes into 
account sixty-six cases. 29   The survey shows that of these 
                                                            
25 On foundational principles of federal Indian law and how the Court is 
changing them, see David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: 
The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL L. REV. 
1573, 1655 (1996).   
26  Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The 
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Non-Members, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1, 73–77 (1999). 
27 See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 15.  
28 See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 77 
(2015).  
29  Not included in the total number of cases is South Florida Water 
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).  
The case involved an Indian tribe and a number of environmental 
organizations bringing a case against a Florida water management district 
for violation of the Clean Water Act.  The case was remanded for more 
factual findings.  I do not regard this case as a federal Indian law case.  It is 
an environmental law case where one of the plaintiffs happened to be an 
Indian tribe.  I have also not included Department of the Interior v. South 
Dakota, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996).  The case involved a challenge to the Interior 
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sixty-six cases, tribal interests lost forty-seven and a half 
cases and won eighteen and a half cases.30  This represents a 
tribal win/loss ratio of only 28%.  However, that percentage is 
higher than the number reported by Getches in his 2001 study 
(23%),31 and slightly higher than the percentage reported by 
Berger in her more recent study.32   
After much debate, I decided to include Dollar General 
v. Mississippi Choctaw 33 as a tribal win although, perhaps, 
the case is better described as not-a-loss rather than an 
outright win: The Supreme Court split 4–4 thereby affirming 
the decision below that was in favor of tribal civil jurisdiction 
over a non-member.  However, judicial experts seem to agree 
that if Justice Scalia had still been alive, his previous record 
and questioning during the oral argument indicate that, in all 
likelihood, he would have voted against the tribal interests.34 
A. The Record When Cases are Divided According 
to Subject Matter.  
 In this section, the cases are classified according to four 
subject matter areas that affect tribal rights: 
Sovereign/Political Rights, Economic/Property Rights, Rights 
derived from the Trust Relationship, and Cultural/Religious 
                                                            
Secretary’s decision to take land in trust for a Tribe. Without issuing a 
substantive opinion, the Court just issued a GVR.  This meant the Court 
granted cert, vacated the decision below, and ordered the case remanded to 
the Secretary (GVR) so that a new decision could be made using newly 
issued departmental regulations.  
30 The half point comes from the fact that in Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990), the Tribe won half the case (tribal jurisdiction 
over non-member property in the “closed” part of the reservation), but lost 
the other half of the case (no tribal jurisdiction over non-member property 
in the “open” section).   
31 See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 18. 
32 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra note 20. Berger’s percentage of 
tribal wins from 1990 until 2016 is 27.3%. The minor difference can be 
explained by the slightly different scope of the years covered in the two 
surveys. Her count is based on years, 1990–2016, while mine is based on 
Supreme Court terms, from the 1987–88 term until the 2016–17 term.  The 
difference in the times covered results in a difference in the number of cases 
considered: fifty-three in her study, sixty-six for this study. 
33 Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016). 
34 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra note 20, at 1936.   
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Rights.  Sixty-four35 of the sixty-six total cases identified were 
considered for categorization based on subject matter.     
1. Sovereign/Political rights: 38.5 cases.  
This category concerns cases involving the sovereign 
rights of Indians tribes, either to assume jurisdiction over non-
members, or claim sovereign immunity when being sued in 
state or federal court.  Most of the cases decided by the Court 
concerning tribal interests involve, in some manner or 
another, the political or sovereign rights of the tribes, thus 
this category contains thirty-eight and a half out of sixty-six 
cases, making it the largest category. 36  The category also 
concerns the sovereign rights of states to assume jurisdiction 
in Indian Country, or claim sovereign immunity when being 
sued by Tribes, and a few cases involving the application of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act.  Because this Article deems one 
case as being half a loss and half a win for the Tribes,37 the 
record indicates that tribal interests suffered twenty-six and 
a half losses while winning twelve cases (31.1%).  
Of the twelve cases won by the Tribes, nine reinforced 
the sovereign rights of Indian tribes, while three negatively 
impacted state power by denying state taxing authority inside 
Indian Country. 38  Of the nine cases that reinforced tribal 
sovereign rights were the following: two upheld tribal 
sovereign immunity from suits,39 one and a half upheld tribal 
                                                            
35 For the purposes of this section, the Article does not include Lincoln v. 
Vigil, 508 U.S. 192 (2011) or Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 
838 (1989).  Both cases did not easily fit in any of the four categories named 
above.  See discussion, supra notes 142–143. 
36 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), is 
being counted here as half a political rights case and half an economic rights 
case since it denied the states the jurisdiction to regulate gaming in Indian 
Country.     
37 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
38 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Okla. Tax 
Comm’n, v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).  For the definition of 
Indian Country see supra note 47.  
39 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 124 U.S. 2024 (2014); Kiowa Tribe 
v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
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civil jurisdiction over non-members, 40  one upheld tribal 
jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 41 and one 
mandated exhaustion of tribal court remedies before a law 
suit challenging tribal jurisdiction could be filed in federal 
court.42  Two of the more important wins were California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, where the Court rejected 
state jurisdiction over Indian gaming,43 and United States v. 
Lara, where the Court held that Supreme Court decisions 
divesting Indian tribes of jurisdiction over non-members were 
decisions based on federal common law and as such could be 
overturned by Congress.44  More recently, one case allowed 
tribal convictions to be counted for the purpose of federal 
sentencing; 45 another case held that an Indian reservation 
had not been disestablished.46   
The twenty-six and a half losses can be divided 
between cases extending or recognizing state power over 
Indian Country 47 or Indian Affairs and cases that reduced 
tribal power.   
Thirteen and a half cases negatively impact tribal 
sovereignty: seven and a half cases denied tribal civil or 
criminal jurisdiction over non-members, 48  five cases either 
                                                            
40 Dollar Gen. v. Miss. Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016); and half of Brendale 
v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990). 
41 Miss. Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
42 Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
43 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
44 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
45 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
46 Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).  
47 “Indian Country” is a term of art defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151.  It includes 
all lands within Indian reservations as well as land held in trust or 
restricted fee by the United States for the benefit of Indians, and land set 
aside by the United States for Dependent Indian Communities. 
48 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 
679 (1993); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading 
v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1980); El Paso Natural Gas 
v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999).  
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prevented ribes from suing states49 or refused to extend tribal 
sovereign immunity,50 and one case refused to limit election 
to the State Commission on Native Hawaiian Affairs to Native 
Hawaiians.51   
Thirteen cases can be described as allowing state 
jurisdiction.  While eight of these cases dealt with the 
authority of states to tax, 52  one extended state criminal 
jurisdiction in Kansas, 53  and three others diminished the 
extent of Indian country, thereby extending state general 
authority over these areas.54  Finally, one case narrowed the 
application of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), implicitly 
extending state authority over such cases.55  
2. Economic/property rights: 14.5 cases.  
This section concerns tribal rights, more easily 
described as property rights or economic rights.  Not included 
in this category are cases where the court was deciding the 
continued existence of Indian Country.56  While those cases, 
                                                            
49 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of 
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); and Inyo Cty. v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 
U.S. 701 (2003).  
50 Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (refusing to extend tribal sovereign 
immunity to tribal employees committing torts off the reservation but 
within the scope of their employment); C&L Enter. v. Citizens Band of 
Potawatomi, 532 U.S. 422 (2001) (finding an explicit waiver of tribal 
sovereign immunity). 
51 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (1990). 
52 Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Dep’t of Taxation 
v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 679 (1994); Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 
(1998); Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr., 526 U.S. 32 (1999); City of 
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Wagnon v. Prairie 
Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Cty. of Yakima v. 
Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); and Cass Cty. v. Leech Lake 
Band, 524 U.S. 103 (1998).  
53 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993). 
54 Alaska v. Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1988); and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).  
55 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (holding that a 
biological father who never had “custody” of his child is not eligible to take 
advantage of the Act to challenge an adoption proceeding).  
56 Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016); Alaska v. Vill. of Venetie, 522 
U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1988); 
and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). 
290 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
such as the ones involving the disestablishment of Indian 
reservations have certainly have some economic or property 
aspect to them, they are primarily about which body may 
assume jurisdiction over certain issues – the tribes, the states, 
or the federal government.  Therefore, they are more correctly 
categorized as political rights cases.  
Of these fourteen and a half cases, tribal interests won 
five and a half cases and lost nine, which amounts to a 37.9% 
tribal win rate.  This is the highest tribal win rate of the four 
categories.  The most meaningful tribal victory was California 
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 57 which continued to 
interpret P.L. 280 as not allowing state civil regulatory 
jurisdiction in Indian Country.58  Besides Cabazon, the tribal 
wins include two tribal contract disputes under the Indian 
Self-Determination Act, 59 two cases interpreting treaties or 
agreements with Indian Nations, 60  and one Indian water 
rights case, Arizona v. California. 61  
The tribal losses are eclectic and, therefore, not easily 
categorized.  They range from an early case dealing with the 
subsistence rights of Native Alaskans, 62 to a case allowing 
federal taxation of Indian gaming. 63   Another three cases 
dealt with tribal attempts to confirm property rights in 
minerals,64 or submerged land.65  Two other cases disallowed 
minimal individual interests in land to escheat to tribes, 66 
while another applied the statute of limitations to a contract 
dispute between a tribe and the United States. 67  Finally, 
                                                            
57 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  
58 The case is included in this section as counting for half a case since it is 
also included for half a case in the sovereign/political rights section.  
59 Salazar v. Ramah Navajo, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012); Cherokee Nation v. 
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005). 
60 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Idaho v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001).  
61 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000). 
62 Amoco Prod. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).  
63 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001). 
64 Amoco Prod. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999). 
65 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 521 U.S. 261 (1997); United States v. Cherokee 
Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).   
66 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 
(1997). 
67 Menominee v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).  
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another case allowed the state of Hawaii to continue the sale 
of lands that were originally ceded by the Kingdom of 
Hawaii.68  
3. Rights derived from the Federal-trust 
relationship: 8 cases.    
There were eight cases that, in some form or another, 
interpreted the trust relationship Indian nations have with 
the United States.  Since 1831, when Chief Justice Marshall 
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia refused to consider Indian 
nations as foreign nations and instead described them as 
domestic dependent nations whose relationship with the 
United States resembled that of a ward to its guardian,69 the 
political relationship between the United States and the tribes 
has been described as a trust relationship. 70   Under that 
relationship, tribes are the beneficiary of the trust and the 
United States is the trustee.  In these eight Indian trust 
doctrine cases, tribal interests won only one case, a breach of 
trust claim against the United States, 71  and lost seven (a 
12.5% winning rate).  The tribal losses included three breach-
of-trust claims. 72   In two other cases, tribes attempted, 
without success, to apply the Indian trust doctrine to statutes 
and doctrines of general applicability, meaning statutes or 
doctrines not specifically directed at Indians or Indian 
                                                            
68 Hawaii v. Office of Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009).  
69 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (holding that Indian 
tribes, being neither foreign nations nor states of the Union, could not 
invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).  
70 For a comprehensive treatment of the trust doctrine, see Mary Christina 
Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty, The Trust 
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471 (1994).       
71 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).  
72 United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (“Navajo I”), and 
United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (“Navajo II”) (both 
cases finding that no statutes allowed the Navajo Nation to successfully sue 
the United states for breach of trust). United States v. Tohono O’Odham, 
563 U.S. 307 (2011), is included here although the Tribe was not allowed to 
sue the United States for breach of trust in the Federal Court of Claims only 
because it had already filed a similar case in federal district court. 
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tribes.73  Finally, in Patchak, the Court allowed non-Indian 
individuals to challenge the United States’ decision to take 
land into trust for Indian tribes, 74  while in Carcieri v. 
Salazar 75  it restricted the application of Section 5 of the 
Indian Reorganization Act to tribes under federal jurisdiction 
as of 1934.76   
The low rate of tribal wins in this area indicates that 
the Court is construing trust obligations narrowly. 77   The 
Court also does not want to extend general principles of trust 
law to interpret the extent of the Indian trust doctrine unless 
specifically mandated to do so by Congress.78    
4. Cultural/Religious Rights: 3 cases. 
There are only three cases in this category and, 
unfortunately, tribal interests lost every one of them.  Two of 
the cases, Matal v. Tam 79  and Employment Division v. 
Smith, 80  were not concerned per se with any doctrines of 
federal Indian law.  Matal is a non-Indian law case holding 
that the use of arguably racially offensive words in 
trademarks is protected by the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment.  The holding in Matal, however, doomed the 
efforts of Indians to force the National Football League to 
abandon the “Redskins” trademark.81  Employment Division 
v. Smith dealt with whether the use of peyote as a sacrament 
                                                            
73 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) (refusing to 
apply the trust doctrine to allow the Tribe to benefit from the “fiduciary 
exception” to the attorney-client privilege); Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath 
River Water Users, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (refusing to apply the trust doctrine to 
exceptions contained in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
74 Match-E-B-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012). 
75 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
76 Section 5, codified at 25 U.S.C. 5108, authorizes the Secretary of the 
Interior to take land into trust for the benefit of Indians. 
77 See Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 509–13 (finding that neither the Indian Mineral 
Leasing Act or any other Acts of Congress imposed a trust duty that was 
specific enough to give rise to a cause of action for the breach of any duty 
connected to the Secretarial approval of the Navajo lease with Peabody Coal 
Corporation).  
78 See U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011).  
79 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).    
80 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
81 See Pro-Football v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (2015). 
No. 2:277]             LAST 30 YEARS OF FED. INDIAN LAW 293 
 
in Native American religious practices was protected under 
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.  The Court 
held that criminal laws of general applicability that only 
incidentally imposed burdens on the exercise of religion 
cannot be challenged under the free exercise clause of the 
First Amendment.  The constitutional principle devised by the 
Court to decide the case affected all religions.  The third case, 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 82  held that nearly all 
federal actions negatively impacting Native American sacred 
sites located on federal land could not be challenged under the 
free exercise clause because such actions did not substantially 
burden the religious practices of Native American 
practitioners.83  
B. The Record Based on the Type of Law Used to 
Decide the Cases. 
This part divides the cases into four categories: federal 
common law, statutory/treaty interpretation, constitutional 
law, and procedural law.84  (The relevant federal Indian law 
cases all fit into one of these four categories.  In spite of strong 
arguments from various scholars that evolving norms of 
international law, 85  such as the 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 86  should 
provide the rules of decisions in many Indian law cases, the 
Court has, unfortunately, not heeded that recommendation.87)  
With regard to categorization, whether a case is decided using 
federal common law or constitutional law is usually readily 
                                                            
82 Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Ass., 485 U.S. 439 (1988).   
83 Id.  For an in-depth analysis of the case, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Towards a Balanced Approached for the Protection of Native American 
Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 269, 279–88 (2012).   
84 This last category is, in effect, a residual one containing all cases not 
fitting in the first three categories.   
85  See Robert A. Williams Jr., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST 
COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 
(2005); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. 
REV. 31 (1996).    
86 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 12, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 12, 2007).  
87 See Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173 (2014).  
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identifiable, although that issue was the subject of at least one 
Supreme Court decision in federal Indian law.88 
1. Federal Common law decisions: 28.5 
cases. 
Historically, the Court has left the role of governing the 
United States relations with the Indian nations to Congress, 
so one would think that most of the cases would be about 
interpreting statutes defining the relationships between the 
tribes, the states, and the federal government.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, the Court uses federal common law more than 
any other type of law when deciding cases involving tribal 
interests.  The survey indicates that twenty-eight and a half 
cases, out of a total of sixty-six cases, were decided on federal 
common law grounds.89  Of these federal common law cases, 
tribal interests won nine and lost nineteen and a half cases (a 
tribal win/loss ratio of 31.5%).  
  Of the wins, one case was the 4–4 decision without an 
opinion in Dollar General, 90  two upheld tribal sovereign 
immunity,91 one allowed a tribe to sue the United States for 
breach of trust in the management of trust assets,92 and one 
was half of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes which allowed 
tribal jurisdiction over non-members in the “closed” parts of 
the reservation. 93  Two of the more meaningful wins came 
early on.  In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
the tribe was allowed to conduct certain gaming activities free 
of state regulation, 94 and in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
LaPlante, 95  the Court reaffirmed and extended the 
                                                            
88 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that cases divesting 
Indian tribes of inherent sovereignty are based on federal common law and 
not constitutional law). 
89 The one half is the result of considering California v. Cabazon Band, 480 
U.S. 202 (1987), as half a statutory interpretation case and half a federal 
common law case.    
90 See discussion, supra notes 33–34. 
91 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 124 U.S. 2024 (2014); Kiowa Tribe 
v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).  
92 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).   
93 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
94 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
95 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).  
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requirement that non-members being sued in tribal court 
should first have to exhaust their tribal court remedies before 
challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal court.  In addition, 
the tribal percentage of wins reflects three of tribal wins 
against the Oklahoma Tax Commission, the outcomes of 
which may have been the result of an overly aggressive anti–
tribal agenda on behalf of that Commission.96       
The tribal loss category can be divided into four 
subcategories: 1. Tribal jurisdiction over non-members; 2. 
State taxation inside Indian reservations; 3. Cases 
interpreting the trust doctrine; and 4. Cases involving tribal 
or state sovereign immunity.  
Tribal interests lost six and a half cases out of seven 
and a half cases involving tribal jurisdiction over non-
members.97  Tribal interests also lost six cases involving the 
states’ attempts to tax activities on Indian land or Indian 
reservations. 98  Judicial interpretation of the trust doctrine 
also proved detrimental to tribes as tribal interests lost four 
cases.  Two cases involved the Navajo Nation’s attempts to sue 
                                                            
96 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 
(1991); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Okla. 
Tax Comm’n, v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). It is noteworthy 
that these are the only three cases Indian nations won fighting the states’ 
attempts to tax activities in Indian Country using the Indian preemption 
doctrine after 1989, the year the Court issued its decision in Cotton 
Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).  The author has argued 
elsewhere that this 1989 opinion profoundly modified the nature of the 
Indian preemption doctrine.  See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and 
Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. IND. L. REV. 391, 420–
21 (2007–2008). 
97 The six cases are: Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); South Dakota v. 
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 
(1997); Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 
533 U.S. 353 (2001); and Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & 
Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008). The tribes also lost half of Brendale v. 
Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
98  Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Dep’t of Taxation 
v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 679 (1994); Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 
(1998); Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr., 526 U.S. 32 (1999); City of 
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); and Wagnon v. 
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).   
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the United States for breach of trust.99  Another one involved 
a tribal attempt to apply the trust doctrine to the Freedom of 
Information Act. 100  Perhaps the most important case, in a 
jurisprudential sense, is United States v. Jicarilla Apache 
Nation, 101 which held that the Indian tribe could not benefit 
from the “fiduciary exception” to the attorney-client privilege 
when attempting to get documents from its trustee, the 
United States.  The importance of this case stems from 
language in the opinion indicating that, absent specific 
statutory language, the general law of trust could not be 
imported to further define the duties of the United States as 
trustee for the Tribes because its role as trustee was so 
different than that of a regular trustee. 102  Tribal interests 
also lost three cases dealing with sovereign immunity.  Two 
cases involved tribal sovereign Immunity, 103  and one the 
sovereign immunity of the states.104   
In conclusion, among the cases decided on federal 
common law grounds, tribes won in the area of tribal 
                                                            
99  United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (“Navajo I”) and 
United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (“Navajo II”) (both 
cases finding that no statutes allowed the Navajo Nation the right to sue 
the United states for breach of trust). While both cases could be classified 
as involving statutory construction in that the issue was whether statutes 
could fairly be interpreted as allowing a breach of trust action against the 
United States for mismanagement of trust assets, I view them as being more 
about applying the Indian trust doctrine to the interpretation of statutes 
than just cases about statutory interpretation.      
100 Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath River Water Users, 532 U.S. 1 (2000) (Trust 
doctrine does not create a tribal exception to FOIA). 
101 U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011).  
102 Id. at 174–77. 
103 C.L. Enter. v. Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 422 
(2001) (holding that the Tribe had waived its immunity) and Lewis v. Clark, 
137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (refusing to extend the sovereign immunity of the 
Tribe to tribal employees committing torts off the reservation while on tribal 
assignment).   
104 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997) (refusing to extend the 
Ex parte Young doctrine to allow the tribe to sue the State, stating “It is 
apparent, then, that if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho's sovereign interest 
in its lands and waters would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as 
almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury. Under 
these particular and special circumstances, we find the Young exception 
inapplicable.”).  
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sovereign immunity and preventing assertion of tax 
jurisdiction by Oklahoma in the three cases involving the 
Oklahoma Tax Commission.  Otherwise, tribal interests lost 
all six cases involving assertion of tribal jurisdiction over non-
members.  The tribes also lost six cases involving state 
taxation of activities in Indian Country.  Clearly, the Court 
used federal common law mostly to protect non-members from 
tribal jurisdiction and to promote state sovereignty (through 
taxation) inside Indian Country. 
2. Statutory Interpretation cases: 21.5 
cases. 
Among the sixty-six cases, twenty-one and a half 
involved statutory/treaty interpretation.  Among those, the 
tribal interests lost fifteen and won six and a half cases or 
30.2% of all the cases in this category.  It is interesting to note 
that beside Cabazon (counting for half a case),105 all other six 
tribal wins involved interpretations of Indian specific 
legislation.  Two involved interpretation of the Indian Self-
Determination Act. 106  Two more involved treaty and quasi 
treaty interpretations. 107   The oldest case decided in this 
category involved interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act,108 and the last decided case, Nebraska v. Parker, involved 
federal legislation which was alleged to have disestablished 
an Indian reservation.109  
                                                            
105 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) 
(interpreting P.L. 280 as not allowing state civil regulatory jurisdiction over 
Indian gaming).  
106 Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012); Cherokee 
Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005).  Interestingly, in the seven years 
separating these two cases, tribal interests did not win one case at the 
Supreme Court.  
107 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) and 
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). This is labeled a quasi-treaty 
case because the Court had to interpret an 1891 Act that ratified two 
previous tribal agreements made with the Coeur D’Alene Tribe.  The Court 
held that Congress intended to reserve all submerged land under lakes and 
rivers when it legislatively ratified these two previous tribal agreements.   
108 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).  
109 Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).  
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Among the tribal losses, ten cases involved Indian 
specific legislation, and five involved general type of 
legislation.  The Indian specific legislation included an 
interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 110  a tax 
provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 111  an 
interpretation of the Indian Reorganization Act, 112  and an 
interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANCSA).113  In addition, two cases interpreted the General 
Allotment Act and the Burke Act, to allow state taxation of 
Indian-owned fee patented lands. 114   Two other cases 
interpreted Acts opening up Indian reservations for non-
Indian settlers as terminating reservation status.115  Another 
case interpreted a Kansas act as conferring criminal 
jurisdiction on the State. 116  Finally, in Hawaii v. Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs, 117  the Court held that when Congress 
enacted the Native Hawaiian Apology Resolution, it did not 
intend to strip the state of Hawaii of its sovereign power to 
alienate lands, which had previously been ceded by the 
                                                            
110 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
111 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).  
112 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009) (“for purposes of § 479, the 
phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction” refers to a tribe that was under 
federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute's enactment. As a result, § 479 
limits the Secretary's authority to taking land into trust for the purpose of 
providing land to members of a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction 
when the IRA was enacted in June 1934.”). 
113  Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (holding that 
sections of the law reserving lands for Indians in fee simple did not create 
“Indian Country” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151).  
114 Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Cass Cty. v. 
Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 103 (1998) (holding that when Congress makes 
Indian or tribal land freely alienable, it clearly signifies an intent to allow 
state taxation of such lands).  
115 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) and Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).  
116 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993).  
117 Hawaii v. Office of Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 172 (2009) (“turning to 
the merits, we must decide whether the Apology Resolution ‘strips Hawaii 
of its sovereign authority to sell, exchange, or transfer,’ the lands that the 
United States held in ‘absolute fee,’ and ‘grant[ed] to the State of Hawaii, 
effective upon its admission into the Union,’ We conclude that the Apology 
Resolution has no such effect.”). 
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Kingdom of Hawaii to the United States and then transferred 
to the State.    
Among the five losses involving general and not Indian 
specific legislation, one case dealt with interpretation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Quiet Title Act. 118  
Another case one held that Indian tribes were not “persons” 
for the purposes of being allowed to sue under Section 1983.119  
One case held that because claims brought under the Price-
Anderson Act required federal court jurisdiction, exhaustion 
of tribal court remedies could not be mandated.120  Another 
one held that the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 conveyed 
everything to the non-Indian surface patentees except the 
coal, which had been reserved to the United States. 121  
Therefore, it was these patentees and not the Tribe who owned 
the coal bed methane gas under the land.  Finally one case 
dealt with the rights of Alaska Natives under the Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).122 
In conclusion, tribal interests were less successful in 
litigating statutory cases than cases based on federal common 
law.  However, tribes won more than half the cases 
interpreting Indian specific statutes.  
3. Constitutional Law: 11 cases.   
Cases decided on constitutional grounds were even 
more detrimental to tribal interests than the two previously 
discussed areas – a total of eleven cases.  The tribes only won 
two cases and lost nine (an 18.1% rate of success).   
                                                            
118 Mach-E-B-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012). 
119 Inyo Cty. v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 provides that any person deprived of rights guaranteed under 
the Constitution or by federal law can sue any person responsible for such 
deprivation as long as that person was acting under color of state law.  
120  El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999). The Price-
Anderson Act regulates liability for nuclear incident. In this case, Navajos 
brought actions relating to injuries suffered as a result of   extraction of 
uranium.  The Court held that of the Price-Anderson Act’s preemption 
provision, 42 U.S.C. 2014(hh), provided for exclusive federal court 
jurisdiction.  
121 Amoco Prod. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).  
122 Amoco Prod. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).  
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The major tribal win, and some may say, the most 
significant win during this period, is United States v. Lara.123  
There the Court held that decisions like Duro v. Reina 
(implicitly divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-
members), were decisions based on federal common law and 
not constitutional law.  As such, these decisions could be 
reversed or modified by Congress.124    
The other tribal win was United States v. Bryant, 125 
holding that convictions obtained in tribal courts could be 
counted for the purpose of enhancing sentences in federal 
courts even if the defendants in tribal courts did not benefit 
from the assistance of counsel.  Although the case is a win for 
recognizing the legitimacy of tribal courts within the federal 
system, some may argue that it is a loss for those who think 
that assistance of counsel is crucial to ensure a fair conviction 
for Indians being prosecuted in tribal court.126   
Of the nine losses, three cases concerned First 
Amendment rights.  Matal v. Tam held that the use of 
arguably racially offensive words in trademarks is protected 
by the free speech clause of the First Amendment. 127  
Employment Division v. Smith involved the use of peyote as a 
sacrament in Native American religious practices, and the 
Court held that criminal laws of general applicability that 
only incidentally impose burdens on the exercise of religion 
cannot be challenged under the free exercise clause of the 
First Amendment. 128  Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery held that 
Native Americans could not use the free exercise clause to 
challenge federal actions negatively impacting Native 
                                                            
123 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
124 For a general discussion of the case, see Alex T. Skibine, United States v. 
Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 47 
(2004).   
125 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).  
126 For a discussion of the issue, see Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel 
for Indians Accused of a Crime: A Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 358 (2013).  
127 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).  Although not per se an Indian 
case, the holding affected the efforts of Native Americans to make the 
Washington Redskins football team change its name.  See Pro-Football v. 
Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (2015).  
128 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).  
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American sacred sites because such actions did not 
substantially burden the Native Americans’ religious 
practices.129  
Two cases involved property rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Hodel v. Irving 130  and Babbitt v. Youpee 131 
struck as unconstitutional the escheat provisions of the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act (ILCA).132  In both cases, the Court 
held that the escheat provisions amounted to the taking of 
property without just compensation. 133   It is debatable 
whether Irving and Youpee are, strictly speaking, losses for 
tribal interests as the Court held that Congress could not, 
without adequate compensation, make individual Indians’ 
minimal interest in land escheat to the tribes.134 
Two cases, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak 135 
and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 136 prevented Indian nations 
from suing states in federal courts because of the states’ 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 137  
While undoubtedly very important to Indian interests, 
Seminole Tribe involved much more of a federal versus state 
conflict than a tribal versus state one as it held that Congress 
could not use its Commerce Clause power to abrogate the 
states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
Finally, United States v. Cherokee Nation138 involved 
the extent of the United States’ navigational servitude under 
the Commerce Clause, and Rice v. Cayetano dealt with the 
                                                            
129 Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Ass., 485 U.S. 439 (1988).   
130 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).  
131 Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
132 The current version of ILCA was codified at 25 U.S.C. 2201 et. seq. 
133 Irving invalidated the escheat provision of Section 207 found at 96 Stat. 
2519, Youpee invalidated the provision at 98 Stat. 3173. The Indian Land 
Consolidation Act was further amended as a result of those two cases. The 
section that replaced former Section 207 containing the escheat provisions 
found unconstitutional was codified at 25 U.S.C. 2206.  
134 See Baca, supra note 21, classifying the two cases as wins for Indians.   
135 Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 788 (1991).  
136 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).  
137 The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  
138 United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).  
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special status of Native Hawaiians under federal law. 139  It 
held that a law restricting voting in a state election to “Native 
Hawaiians” was a racial classification and therefore 
unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.  
4. Administrative/Civil Procedure Law: 5 
cases.  
There are only five cases in this category.  Although 
tribal interests only won one of these cases, representing only 
a 20% win rate, this is by far the least important category 
since the cases here, while very important to the particular 
parties involved, do not represent important precedents 
concerning the status of Indian Nations within the federal 
system.   
The one win was in Arizona v. California.140  The case 
was also the most meaningful among the five cases in this 
category.  The decision held that the claim of the tribes and 
the United States to more water from the Colorado River was 
not precluded by previous decrees, nor was it barred under res 
judicata principles.       
Among the four losses, one case involved a tribe losing 
the right to sue in the Federal Court of Claims because the 
Tribe had already filed a substantially similar case in a 
federal district court. 141   Another one held that the 
Administrative Procedure Act did not prevent the right of an 
executive agency to reprogram monies from one Indian 
program to another. 142   In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Graham, 143 the Court remanded a case (decided in the tribe’s 
favor at the lower level) but only because the case had initially 
been improperly removed to federal court.  Finally, in 
Menominee v. United States, 144 the Court held that the statute 
of limitation contained in the Contract Dispute Act was 
                                                            
139 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
140 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000). 
141 United States v. Tohono O’Odham, 563 U.S. 307 (2011). 
142 Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).  
143 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989). 
144 Menominee v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).  
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applicable to a contract dispute between a tribe and the 
United States involving the Indian Self Determination Act.  
C. The Record When the Cases Are Considered 
along Time Lines.  
It is important to note that the overall percentage of 
tribal wins in the last thirty years, while not strong (28%), has 
increased since Getches published his 2001 survey (23%).145  
However, if one looks at the percentages of tribal wins when 
the cases are divided into ten-year increments, the future 
looks brighter for tribal interests.  From the 1987–1988 term 
to the 1996–1997 term, the Court adjudicated twenty-five 
cases.  Of these, eighteen and a half were tribal losses, and six 
and a half were wins,146 amounting to a 26% tribal win rate.  
From the 1997–1998 term to the 2006–2007 term, the Court 
also heard twenty-five cases.  The tribal interests lost eighteen 
cases, while winning seven.147  This amounts to a 28% Tribal 
                                                            
145 See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 18. 
146 The two most important wins for the tribes during that decade were 
California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (no state jurisdiction over 
Tribal gaming) and Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) 
(ICWA).  Meaningful losses include Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 
U.S. 163 (1989) (State taxation); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 
(1997) (no tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members); Duro v. Reina, 495 
U.S. 676 (1990) (no tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians); 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (state retained sovereign 
immunity in spite of IGRA); and Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988) (no constitutional protection for Indian sacred site located on federal 
land).   
147 Among the more meaningful tribal wins in this decade are Kiowa Tribe 
v. Manufacturing Technologies, 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (tribal sovereign 
immunity); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (treaty 
rights); and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (congressional power 
to overturn implicit divestiture cases).  Important losses include Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (no tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members); 
Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (land owned in Fee by 
Indians pursuant to ANCSA not Indian Country); United States v. Navajo 
Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (no U.S. liability for breach of trust in 
management of tribal natural resources); Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 
U.S. 645 (2001) (no tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members); and Rice v. 
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (classification of Native Hawaiians for the 
purpose of voting in state elections are racial classifications reviewed under 
strict scrutiny).   
304 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW [Vol. 8:2 
win rate.  From the 2007–2008 until the 2016–2017 term, 
there was only sixteen cases.  Eleven cases were tribal losses, 
and five tribal wins.148  This represents a 31.2% tribal win 
rate.  
Although the tribal win rate increased in each successive 
decade, the pro-tribal trend is even more striking when one 
compares the first fifteen years (1987–1988 term until the 
2000–2001 term) with the last fifteen years (2001–2002 term 
until the 2016–2017 term.)  The tabulation shows that there 
were forty-three cases decided in the first fifteen years with 
the tribal interests losing thirty-two and a half cases while 
only winning ten and a half cases, representing a 24.4% rate 
of tribal wins.  However, in the last fifteen years, there were 
only twenty-three cases.  However, of these twenty-three 
cases, tribal interests won eight cases while losing fifteen.  
This represents a 34.7% rate of tribal wins and may indicate 
that, for the tribes, the worst is behind them and there might 
indeed be a light at the end of this anti tribal sovereignty 
tunnel.  Besides the Court being receptive to the idea of 
including Indian tribes as the Third Sovereign within our 
federalist system, other factors may have contributed to this 
rather abrupt drop in the number of cases decided as well as 
the increase in the percentage of tribal wins.  One of these 
factors could be the creation of the Tribal Supreme Court 
Project, a joint effort by the Native American Rights Fund and 
the National Congress of American Indians, to more closely 
monitor and control the kind of cases appealed to the Supreme 
Court by tribal interests.149   
* * * 
                                                            
148 Meaningful tribal wins in this decade include Michigan v. Bay Mills, 134 
S. Ct. 2024 (2014) (Tribal sovereign Immunity) and Nebraska v. Parker, 136 
S. Ct. 1072 (2016) which is included as an important case because it may 
represent a turning point on how the Court determines whether Indian 
reservations have been disestablished.  Important tribal losses include 
Pains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008) 
(no tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members); U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) (trust doctrine not applicable to interpret FOIA); 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (applicability of ICWA); 
and Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (Section 5 of IRA only applicable 
to tribes under federal jurisdiction as of 1934).   
149 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra note 20, at 1909–11. 
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In conclusion, the Court invokes federal common law 
more frequently than any other type of law in deciding federal 
Indian law cases.  In addition, cases involving tribal political 
rights are more numerous than cases in any other category 
and federal common law is used most often in deciding such 
political rights cases.  
  Although the Tribes won 31.2% of cases concerning 
political rights based on Federal common law, the odds of the 
tribes winning political rights cases based on statutory 
interpretation in this area was even less: two out of nine 
(22%).  In a somewhat curious twist, the tribes won two out of 
five (40%) of the cases based on constitutional law affecting 
tribal political rights.150 
However, the tribes’ chance of winning cases based on 
federal common law, which stands at 28%, is not as good as 
winning cases based on statutory construction, which have a 
31.7% winning rate.  Within the statutory construction 
category, tribal interests have the best chance of winning 
cases dealing with interpretation of Indian specific legislation 
as tribes won six of the sixteen cases in this area (37.5% of the 
cases).  Finally, the tribal win-loss ratio has improved in every 
decade since the 1986–1987 Supreme Court term.      
III. LOOKING FOR EQUILIBRIUM OR JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY? 
A. Evaluating Congressional Response to The 
Court’s Decisions. 
Congress is said to have “plenary power” over Indian 
affairs, 151 and through the Constitution, mostly through the 
                                                            
150 The tribes won in United States v. Lara and United States v. Bryant 
while losing in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Rice v. 
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (1990); and Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 
501 U.S. 775 (1991).  The winning percentage here is curious because for all 
categories, the tribes lost nine of the eleven cases involving constitutional 
law.  See discussion, supra notes 123–139.   
151 For instance, in Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989), the Court stated, “the central function of the Indian Commerce 
Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of 
Indian affairs.” 
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Indian Commerce Clause, it is vested with primacy over 
Indian affairs.152  Recently, one scholar has argued that it is 
normatively right for Congress to take the leading role in 
Indian affairs because it has the better institutional capacity 
to formulate sound policies governing federal relations with 
Indian Nations,153 while another scholar demonstrated that 
Congress is still very active in formulating federal Indian 
policy. 154  Others have argued, however, that Congress has 
ceded its leading role to the Court. 155  Consistent with the 
views expressed in Law as Equilibrium, 156  it is true that 
Congress and the Court, and at times the executive branch, 
are involved in a kind of ongoing dialogue with each other.  As 
once stated by Justice Ginsburg: “Judges . . . participate in a 
dialogue with other organs of government.” 157  This section 
analyzes the interplay between the Court and Congress in the 
field of federal Indian law to understand the nature of the 
dialogue and determine if the Court has taken control over 
such dialogue.158 
Fletcher has persuasively shown that, generally 
speaking, “modern congressional statements” in federal 
Indian policy support tribal self-government, tribal tax 
authority and economic development, as well as tribal 
                                                            
152  The Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that “Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” For a thorough look at the various 
sources of congressional power over Indian Affairs, see Gregory Ablavsky, 
Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015).  
153  See Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and 
Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 85 U. COLO. L. REV 759 (2014). 
154 Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra note 28, at 148–49. 
155 See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 15.  
156 See Eskridge & Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, supra note 22.  
157 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1185, 1198 (1992).  See also Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value 
of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTING CONST. L. Q. 93 
(2000); Maimon Schwarzchild, Pluralism, Conversation, and Judicial 
Restraint, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 961 (2001) (discussing when court decisions 
encourage democratic conversations with the other branches.)  
158 For a comprehensive study of the dynamic relationship between the 
Court’s decision and Congress on all issues, see William N. Eskridge Jr., 
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 
331 (1991).  
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sovereign immunity and the development of tribal courts.159  
This section focuses only on legislation enacted specifically as 
a response to a Supreme Court decision in order to evaluate 
congressional willingness/effort to retain primacy over Indian 
affairs and affirm its policy of tribal self-determination.  
Although many pieces of tribe-specific legislation, whether it 
be land claims or water rights settlements, are somewhat 
related to former Supreme Court decisions, this section does 
not analyze all congressional legislation that may have been 
only partially influenced by Supreme Court decisions.160       
1. Indian Gaming.  
Perhaps the most interesting case study involving the 
interaction between the three government branches in the 
field of Indian affairs is in the area of Indian gaming.  
Although Congress had been working on legislation to 
regulate Indian gaming for some time, it was only after the 
Court issued its 1987 decision in California v. Cabazon161 that 
Congress found the political will to enact the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).162  Eight years after IGRA was 
enacted into law, the Court had the opportunity to respond to 
the legislation and declared the part of IGRA allowing Tribes 
to sue states for failing to negotiate tribal state compacts in 
                                                            
159 See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 15, at 140–50.   
160 Not included, for instance, are the twenty-seven tribal legislative water 
rights settlements enacted since 1978.  For sure, Supreme Court cases, such 
as Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), and Arizona v. California, 
373 U.S. 546 (1963) that defined the extent of tribal water rights, and cases 
such as Arizona v.  San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983), allowing 
for state court adjudication of tribal water rights, played an important role 
in influencing the states and the tribes to settle their water rights dispute 
through legislation.  However, these cases were all decided before 1986 and 
it would be inaccurate to say that these legislative settlements were a direct 
response to such cases.  For an analysis of such water rights settlements, 
see Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, Practical Reasoning, and 
Negotiated Settlements, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133 (2010).   
161 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  
162 Pub. L. 199-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 2701bet 
seq.).  For comprehensive analysis, see Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act: Background and Legislative History, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. 
J. 99 (2010); Robert N. Clinton, Enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act of 1988: The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or Another Federal 
Usurpation of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 17 (2010).   
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good faith to be unconstitutional.163  While that decision did 
not generate a reaction from Congress in the field of Indian 
gaming legislation, the executive branch responded by 
enacting new regulations allowing Tribes to bypass an 
assertion of state sovereign immunity by allowing them to ask 
the Secretary of the Interior to issue Class III gaming 
procedures.164  So far, the power of the Secretary to issue such 
procedures has been struck down by two circuit courts,165 but 
the Supreme Court has not yet decided to take a case 
challenging the validity of the regulations.166  
2. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over non-
Indians and non-member Indians.  
Congress reacted to the Court’s decisions to divest 
tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians and 
non-Indians through legislation.  In 1991, Congress enacted 
the so-called Duro Fix, 167  overturning the Court’s 1990 
decision in Duro v. Reina that held that tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-member Indians had been implicitly 
divested.168  Later on, Congress eventually enacted the 2013 
VAWA Amendments. 169   These amendments partially 
overturned Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 170  the 
decision that had found tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians implicitly divested.  The VAWA Amendments allowed 
                                                            
163 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress 
could not use its Indian Commerce Clause power to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.) 
164 The final regulations were issued in 1999.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 17, 535-36, 
codified at 25 C.F.R. 291.  
165 See Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 
C. Ct. 32 (2008) and New Mexico v. Dep’t of the Interior, 854 F.3d 1207 (10th 
Cir. 2017).  
166  For an argument supporting the Secretary’s authority to issue such 
regulations, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative 
Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 253, 293–96 (2010) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit 
opinion). 
167 PUB. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat 646 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
1301).     
168 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
169 Codified at 25 U.S.C. 1304. 
170 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).     
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Indian tribes to re-acquire criminal jurisdiction over some 
non-Indians committing acts of domestic violence against 
Indians residing in Indian Country.171  
There was a legal challenge to Congress’s power to 
overturn or modify cases such as Duro and Oliphant, but the 
Court held in United States v. Lara that “the statute seeks to 
adjust the tribes' status. It relaxes the restrictions, recognized 
in Duro, that the political branches had imposed on the tribes’ 
exercise of inherent prosecutorial power.” 172   Therefore, 
Congress could modify the results in such cases.173  Whether 
non-members can be prosecuted in tribal courts without the 
full protection of the United State constitution has not yet 
been decided.174  
3. Indian land Consolidation Act:175  
The Court twice struck as unconstitutional provisions 
of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), 176 allowing very 
small interests in land owned by tribal members to escheat to 
their tribe under certain conditions.  Each time, Congress 
reacted by enacting a new version of the law.  The first ILCA 
was enacted in 1983 and its escheat provision was declared 
unconstitutional in Hodel v. Irving.177  An amended version 
attempting to resolve the constitutional issues was enacted in 
                                                            
171 Tribes wishing to re-acquire such jurisdiction would have to meet a 
number of conditions. For background and implementation of the 2013 
VAWA Amendments, see Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian 
Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564 (2016). 
172 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).  
173 For in depth analysis of the decision and its background, see Bethany R. 
Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 
5 (2004) and Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, 
and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 TULSA L. REV. 48 (2004). 
174  See Note, Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction after United States v. Lara: 
Answering the Constitutional Challenge to the Duro Fix, 93 CAL. L. REV. 847 
(2005). See also Samuel E. Ennis, Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of 
Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. REV. 553 (2009). 
175 25 U.S.C. 2201–2219  
176 Pub. L. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2517.   
177 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
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1984 but declared unconstitutional in Babbitt v. Youpee.178  A 
third version was enacted in 2000, but was replaced by the 
2004 American Indian Probate Reform Act before it could be 
implemented.179  
4. Overturning Patchak:  
Following the Court’s decision in Mach-E-Be-Nash-
She-Wish v. Patchak, 180  which had allowed a non-tribal 
member to challenge a decision by the Secretary of the Interior 
to transfer some land to the tribe from fee to trust, Congress 
enacted the 1994 Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act.181  
That Act attempted to overturn or, perhaps, moot the Court’s 
decision in Patchak by reaffirming the Secretary’s decision to 
take the land into trust and directing the dismissal of any 
action (future or pending) challenging such fee to trust 
transfer.  The Court recently upheld the constitutionality of 
this legislation.182  The grant of cert may have seemed unusual 
as the case only concerned a tribe specific statute.  However, 
the legal principles involved were important as they concerned 
the power of Congress to affect results reached in previous 
court decisions. 
5. Overturning Employment Division v. 
Smith.183  
Tribal interests were successful in overturning the 
practical effect of Employment Division when Congress 
amended the American Indian Religious Freedom Act in 
1994. 184  The 1994 Amendments protected the sacramental 
                                                            
178 Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
179 Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991. 
180 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 
567 U.S. 209  (2012). 
181 Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913.  
182 See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). 
183 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the 
strict scrutiny test of the Free Exercise Clause was not applicable when 
general criminal laws only incidentally impacted one’s religious practices. 
Here, the use of Peyote for sacramental purposes.)  See discussion, supra 
notes 80–81.  
184 42 U.S.C. 1996(a)-(b).  
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use of peyote by practitioners of Indian religions by 
prohibiting any state or federal prosecution for such 
sacramental use.  The Congress also responded more 
generally to Employment Division by enacting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1994.185  RFRA restored 
the strict scrutiny/compelling interest test when a law of 
general applicability substantially burdened one’s free 
exercise of religion.186 RFRA was not a product of tribal efforts 
but was lobbied for by a coalition of mainstream religious 
groups.187   
6. Responding to Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery.188 
It is noteworthy that RFRA was not meant to directly 
affect the result in Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery.  Lyng held 
that Indian religious practitioners could not invoke the free 
exercise clause to challenge federal actions negatively 
impacting religious sacred sites located on federal land 
because such federal actions had not “substantially burdened” 
their religious practices. 189  The actual result in Lyng was, 
however, overturned when Congress designated some lands, 
which included the whole area at issue in Lyng, as permanent 
wilderness under the Smith River National Recreation Act.190  
Furthermore, in response to Lyng, Congress amended the 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) in 1992 to add 
“properties of traditional and cultural importance to an Indian 
tribe” to properties eligible to be included in the National 
                                                            
185 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1-2000bb-4. 
186 AIRFA was declared unconstitutional but only as applied to states in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).   
187 For background on this legislation, see Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. 
Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
209 (1994).  
188 Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Ass., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
189 Id. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 187, at 229.  See also Navajo 
Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(holding that the court was bound by the result in Lyng in spite of RFRA).  
For a comprehensive analysis of this Ninth Circuit decision, see Jonathan 
Knapp, Making Snow in the Desert: Defining Substantial Burden under 
RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY L. Q. 259 (2009). 
190 See 16 U.S.C. 460 bbb-3(b)(2)(H) (2000). 
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Register of Historic Places. 191   In addition, Indian nations 
must now also be included in the consultation process 
provided in the NHPA.192   
* * * 
In a recent article analyzing in depth the actions of 
Congress concerning Indians, Kirsten Carlson found that 
Indian tribes were surprisingly adept at persuading Congress 
to enact legislation favorable to tribal interests. 193  As the 
Patchak legislation shows,194 this is undoubtedly true when it 
comes to getting Congress to enact tribe specific bills or 
legislation not opposed by states or powerful non-tribal 
interests such as the interest groups that have prevented 
legislation preempting state taxation in Indian Country or 
amendments to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 195  
Otherwise, the only major pan-tribal successes involving 
congressional reaction to Supreme Court decisions in the last 
thirty years have been the enactment of IGRA, the Duro Fix, 
the 1992 Amendments to the National Historic Preservation 
Act, the 2013 VAWA Amendments, and the 1994 
Amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act.  
There have been, of course, many other tribal legislative 
successes.  But such successes, like for instance, the Tribal 
Law & Order Act, 196 or the Cobell Settlement, 197 have not 
                                                            
191 16 U.S.C. § 470a (d)(6)(a). See also Anderson, Berger, et al. AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW, CASES AND COMMENTARY 802–03 (3d ed. 2008).     
192 16 U.S.C. § 470a (d)(6)(b). See also Sarah Palmer, Cherie Shanteau, 
Barbara Osborne, Strategies for addressing Native Traditional Cultural 
Properties, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 45 (2005). 
193 See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Tribes Lobbying Congress: Who Wins and 
Why 9-12, Draft Report Presented at the Michigan State University’s 13th 
Annual Indigenous Law Conference (2017).  
194 See discussion, supra notes 180–182.  
195 See discussion, infra notes 223, 230. 
196 Pub. L. 11-211, 124 Stat 2261. 
197 Pub. L. No. 11-291 (2010).  The Cobell litigation involved a class action 
representing the claims of over 300,000 individuals having trust accounts 
with the United States.  No doubt, the parties’ willingness to legislatively 
settle that litigation was influenced by recent Supreme Court cases such as 
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 557 U.S. 465 (2003), and 
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003), defining the 
circumstances under which the United States could be liable for breach of 
fiduciary duties.  The legislative settlement of the Cobell litigation, however, 
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been the result of a direct congressional reaction to a Supreme 
Court case.  Others, like RFRA for instance, were not the 
product of tribal lobbying efforts.198    
B. Evaluating the Court’s Reaction to Federal 
Legislation.   
This section evaluates the Court’s reaction to 
congressional legislation to determine if the Court is looking 
for a political equilibrium in reaching results consistent with 
the positions of Congress on Indian issues. 
1. Interpreting the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA).  
As stated earlier, the Court struck part of IGRA as 
unconstitutional in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.199  The Court 
also interpreted IGRA as allowing federal taxation of tribal 
gaming revenues in Chickasaw Nation v. United States. 200  
While Seminole Tribe obviously upset the carefully crafted 
balance reached by Congress between tribal and state 
interests in tribal gaming within Indian Country, the decision 
was part of a much larger debate among the Justices 
concerning the power of Congress to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity using the 
Commerce Clause.  However, the refusal of the Court to allow 
Tribes to sue state official using the Ex Parte Young doctrine 
reflects a profound disagreement with the Congressional 
policies enunciated in IGRA. 201  As argued elsewhere, that 
policy revealed a congressional desire to include tribes into a 
                                                            
cannot be considered a direct reaction to any Supreme Court cases defining 
the trust duties of the United States to specific tribes.  See generally, Cobell 
v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070; 
and Cobell v. Kempthorne, 569 F. Supp. 2d 223 (F.D.C. 2008). 
198 See Laycock & Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, supra note 187.  
199 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See discussion, supra notes 
167–171.  
200 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001). 
201 For a critique of that aspect of the Court’s opinion, see Skibine, supra 
note 166, at 297–300. 
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model of what some have termed cooperative federalism.202  
Although I also noted that IGRA was different from the typical 
cooperative federalism statute in that it directly involved the 
states in the negotiation of compacts with Indian nations,203 I 
also believed that IGRA could fit “in the concept of cooperative 
federalism, a concept which should be based on tri-lateral 
agreements between the tribes, the federal government, and 
the states.”204  
2. Interpreting the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA).  
In Venetie, 205 the Court reacted to enactment of the 
1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) by 
holding that land set aside for Native Corporations under the 
Act was not Indian Country.  Therefore, the state of Alaska 
could tax activities taking place on those lands.  The Court 
achieved this surprising result twenty-seven years after 
ANCSA was enacted into law by insisting that lands set aside 
by Congress for dependent Indian communities, such as 
Alaskan Native Villages, could only qualify as “Indian 
Country” for the purpose of Section 1151,206 if such lands also 
remained in control of the federal government.  Because 
Native Alaskan villages held their lands in fee, the federal 
                                                            
202 Id. See also, id. at 285–87 (“[f]ederal statutes in the new Tribal Self-
Governance Era… have progressively adopted what could be described as a 
compact model…. These statutes can be seen as incorporating or integrating 
Indian tribes as sovereign political entities within “Our Federalism” and 
creating what could be called a system of federalism between the tribes and 
the federal government.”).  
203 Typical statutes embodying a cooperative federalism model include the 
Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 101-459, 104 Stat. 2399, the Safe Drinking Water 
Act, Pub. L. 99-339, 100 Stat 642, and the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. 100-4, 
101 Stat 7.  Indian tribes are included in the statutes and treated as States 
for the purpose as being able to assume primacy over the reservations’ air 
and water resources.  
204 Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, supra note 166, at 
287. 
205 Alaska v. Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).   
206 See the language of Section 1151, supra note 147.  Although 18 U.S.C. 
1151 defines what lands qualify as Indian Country for the purpose of 
criminal jurisdiction, the definition has been applied to civil jurisdictional 
issues.  
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government did not have complete control over such lands. 
Therefore, such lands could not qualify as Indian Country.207           
3. Interpreting Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA).   
Since its enactment in 1978, the Court has only 
interpreted the Indian Child Welfare Act twice.  From a pro-
tribal interpretation in Holyfield in 1988,208 the Court came 
up with a very narrow interpretation of the law in Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl in 2013. 209   This new interpretation 
severely limited the capabilities of biological Indian fathers to 
invoke the protection of ICWA when intervening in adoption 
proceedings.  The Court held that a biological father 
challenging the mother’s decision to put the child up for 
adoption had to have had “custody” of his child in order to 
invoke the protections of ICWA.  
4. Interpreting Section 5 of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA). 
Section 5 allows the Secretary of Interior to transfer 
land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes.210  For years, 
the Secretary had construed that section as applying to all 
Indian tribes as long as such tribes were under federal 
jurisdiction as of the date of each land transfer.  At the urging 
of the states, the Court in Carcieri gave a very narrow 
interpretation to the Indian Reorganization Act, restricting 
application of Section 5 to those tribes under federal 
jurisdiction as of 1934.211  The Court was able to reach this 
                                                            
207 For a critical evaluation of the Court's reasoning in Venetie, see Kristen 
Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village 
of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73 (1999). See also David M. Burton, Canons of 
Construction, Stare Decisis, and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test of 
Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37 (1998).  
208 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 20 (1989) (coming 
up with a national definition of “domicile” that prevented an Indian mother 
from avoiding application of ICWA by moving off the reservation to give 
birth in order to claim that her domicile was no longer on the reservation).     
209 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).  
210 Codified at 25 U.S.C. 5108.  
211 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  
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result by surprisingly claiming that there was no ambiguity 
whatsoever in the statute and, therefore, Chevron deference 
was not applicable.212  In doing so, the Court set aside a thirty-
year-old formal regulation of the Interior Department which 
had interpreted the statute as only requiring that a tribe be 
under federal jurisdiction at the time the land was transferred 
into trust.213  
5. Indian Land Consolidation Act. 
As noted earlier, the Court struck down as 
unconstitutional parts of the Indian Land Consolidation Act 
twice.214  On November 27, 2017, the Court declined to revisit 
the Indian Land Consolidation (ILCA) when it denied cert to 
a petition challenging a ruling holding that ILCA allows the 
United States to take land into trust for a tribe even though 
the United States currently does not hold any land in trust for 
that Tribe.215  It is interesting to note that in each of the four 
examples cited above and this one, the Court ruled against the 
tribal interests. 216   However, of the five statutes, only the 
Indian Land Consolidation Act generated a congressional 
response.  This shows that if tribal interests are not in direct 
conflict with the interests of states or important non-tribal 
interests, Congress is ready and willing to correct Supreme 
                                                            
212 Chevron v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Under Chevron, courts are 
supposed to give deference in interpreting an ambiguous statute to the 
federal agency in charge of implementing such statute as long as such 
agency was delegated by Congress the power to make such interpretations.  
213 For critical perspectives on Carcieri, see, e.g., William Wood, Indians, 
Tribes and “Federal” Jurisdiction, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 415 (2016); Sarah 
Washburn, Comment, Distinguishing Carcieri v. Salazar: Why the Supreme 
Court Got It Wrong and How Congress and Courts Should Respond to 
Preserve Tribal and Federal Interests in the IRA's Trust-Land Provisions, 
85 WASH. L. REV. 603 (2010). 
214 See discussion, supra notes 176–180. 
215 See Upstate Citizens for Equality v. United States, 841 F.3d 556 (2016). 
216 Some may also question whether the “Supreme Court decisions in Irving 
and Youpee are actually anti-Indian.  See, e.g., Baca, 40 Years of U.S. 
Supreme Court, supra note 21 (classifying the two decisions as Indian 
victories).   
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Court decisions.   The next sub-section makes this point even 
clearer.  
6. Interpreting the Indian Self 
Determination Act. 
In 1988 and 1994, Congress amended the Indian Self-
Determination Act of 1975. 217   In Cherokee Nation v. 
Leavitt, 218 the Supreme Court unanimously interpreted the 
1988 Amendments as mandating the funding of “Contract 
Support Costs” associated with Self-Determination contracts 
entered into between the United States and the tribes.  
Contract support costs are “reasonable costs” that a federal 
agency would not have incurred, but which tribes are 
incurring in managing such programs. 219  Even though the 
1988 amendments provided that funding under the Act shall 
be contingent on availability of appropriations and Congress 
had not earmarked enough funds to cover all contract support 
costs, the Court reasoned that Congress had still appropriated 
sufficient unrestricted funds to cover the full amount of those 
contract support costs.  Aware of this problem, Congress later 
enacted appropriation bills with language providing that 
contract support costs available to tribes should be capped at 
an amount “not to exceed” amounts appropriated by Congress 
for this activity.  Yet, in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 220 
the Court, this time in a 5–4 decision, held that the United 
States was obligated to award each tribe the full amount of 
contract support costs negotiated in the previous contracts. 
Unlike previous statutory interpretation cases where 
the Court interpreted legislation narrowly to restrict tribal 
rights, in this case the Court stood firmly with the tribes in 
upholding the contractual obligations of the United States.  
The Court was able to achieve this in spite of Congress’s 
attempts to restrict tribal funding through specific language 
                                                            
217 P.L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 450 et. seq. 
amended by P.L. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 in 1988 and further amended in 
1994 by P.L. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250. 
218 Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005).  
219 See 25 U.S.C. 450j-1(a)(2). 
220 Salazar v. Ramah Navajo, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).  
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in appropriation bills.  In effect, the Court put the onus on 
Congress to amend the Indian Self-Determination Act one 
more time or be obligated to fund all tribal contract support 
costs associated with Self-Determination contracts.  What 
accounts for the difference from other areas of statutory 
interpretations where the Court was not that partial to tribal 
interests?  In may be attributed to the fact that in these two 
cases, neither the rights of the states nor the rights of 
individual non-members were at all impacted by the decisions.  
The cases only dealt with the tribes’ contractual and financial 
rights vis-a-vis the federal government.      
C. The Road Not Taken 
Sometimes, congressional or judicial silence on an 
issue can speak as much as enacted legislation and judicial 
decisions.  This section enumerates five key issues where 
tribal interests have failed to enact legislation and concludes 
by listing three areas where anti-tribal interests have not 
succeeded in motivating either Congress or the Court to act.  
1. Tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
members:  
As opposed to cases involving criminal jurisdiction, 
none of the civil jurisdiction cases preventing tribal 
jurisdiction over non-members in Indian Country have been 
overturned.221  Congressional silence and lack of any reaction, 
either for or against tribal jurisdiction in this area speaks 
volume about either a lack of concern with such cases, or an 
inability to address such issues through legislation.   
Although there were bills introduced in Congress at 
various times, for instance S. 578 in 2003, no bill was ever 
reported out of committee so that it could be considered on the 
floor of either the Senate or the House of Representatives.  In 
the case of S. 578, this is due in part to the overly ambitious 
                                                            
221  South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 
(2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); and Plains Commerce Bank 
v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008). The tribes also lost 
half of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).  
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nature of the bill.  It aimed to overturn both Oliphant, the case 
that had divested tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-
members, and the United States v. Montana line of cases, 
which divested tribes of some civil jurisdiction over non-
members. 222   Congressional inaction here can also be 
explained by the fact that the non-tribal interests potentially 
affected by such legislation have considerable more lobbying 
power than the non-member Indians accused of committing 
crimes in Indian Country as was the case during consideration 
of the Duro-Fix legislation. 223   Another factor that may 
explain the lack of congressional interest in favor of legislation 
re-instating tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members is the 
fact that in many of these tribal civil jurisdiction cases, the 
tribal court plaintiff can also bring the lawsuit against the 
non-tribal person in a state or federal court.  Certainly, that 
fact was part of the Supreme Court decision in Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 224  when it concluded its opinion by stating 
“Gisela Fredericks may pursue her case against A–1 
Contractors and Stockert in the state forum open to all who 
sustain injuries on North Dakota’s highway.  Opening the 
Tribal Court for her optional use is not necessary to protect 
tribal self-government; and requiring A–1 and Stockert to 
defend against this commonplace state highway accident 
claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to “the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.”225    
In a recent article, Berger proposed three reasons 
explaining the Court’s anti-tribal bias. First, the Justices are 
unfamiliar with how tribal governments operate.  Secondly, 
the Justices are concerned that non-members are not fully 
protected by the United States Constitution when appearing 
in tribal courts.  Finally, the Court does not see Indian nations 
as truly sovereign governments in charge of governing their 
                                                            
222 For an examination of how this legislation came about and why it failed, 
see Dewi Ioan Ball, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER, THE SUPREME COURT’S 
SILENT REVOLUTION, 149–69 (University of Oklahoma Press 2016).    
223 See discussion, supra notes 168–175. 
224 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997). 
225 Id. at 459.  
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territories.226  The same concerns generated by unfamiliarity, 
lack of constitutional protections, and mixed feelings about 
tribal sovereignty, could also be operating at the congressional 
level to dim any chances of restoring tribal civil jurisdiction 
through legislation.  However, it should be noted that 
although not enacted as a direct reaction to any Supreme 
Court case, Congress did amend some of the major 
environmental statutes to allow tribes to potentially be 
treated as States under those statutes.  Such treatment would 
allow tribes to regulate the activities of non-members in this 
area.227  Perhaps any future tribal efforts in this area should 
focus on specific areas of civil jurisdiction instead of painting 
with a wider brush.228     
2. Pre-empting state tax jurisdiction in 
Indian Country.   
As stated earlier, 8 cases allowed states to tax 
activities on Indian reservations.229  The Court has allowed 
such taxation by either slightly modifying its Indian 
                                                            
226 See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra note 20, at 1914–15. 
227 See the Indian Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2); 
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1377 (e); and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 
42 USC 300j-11(a).  See also Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001). 
See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Control of Air Pollution on Indian 
Reservations, 46 ENVTL. L. 893 (2016).   
228 On the other hand, Congress has allowed some state civil jurisdiction in 
legislation settling tribal land claims and/or recognizing or restoring some 
tribes to federal recognition.  See, e.g., The Wampanoag Indian Claims 
Settlement Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-95, 101 Stat. 704.  See also the 1988 Act 
establishing a reservation for the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community, Pub. L. 100-425, 102 Stat. 1594, and the Klamath Indian Tribe 
Restoration Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-393, 100 Stat. 849.  
229  See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Dep’t of 
Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 679 (1994); Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 
696 (1998); Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr., 526 U.S. 32 (1999); City 
of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Wagnon v. Prairie 
Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Cty. of Yakima v. 
Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); and Cass County v. Leech Lake 
Band, 524 U.S. 103 (1998).  
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preemption analysis,230 or finding that the imposition of the 
tax did not actually occur in Indian Country.231  In all these 
cases, the Court allowed state taxation by finding that the 
legal incidence of the tax did not fall on the Indian tribes.  
Furthermore, in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 232 
the Court invoked the doctrine of laches to prevent the Tribe 
from challenging a State tax because a successful challenge 
would otherwise upset the long held and legitimate 
expectations of non-Indians.233  The lack of legislative activity 
here indicates that once the Supreme Court rules in favor of 
state taxation and against tribal interests in this area, such 
rulings are irreversible through legislation.      
3. Enacting a Seminole fix.  
Legislation is needed to resolve the problems and 
imbalance created by Seminole Tribe v. Florida. 234   In 
Seminole Tribe, the Court struck down a section of IGRA 
allowing the tribes to sue states in federal court for failure to 
negotiate a tribal state gaming compact in good faith as 
unconstitutional.  The Court held that Congress could not use 
its Commerce Clause powers to abrogate the states’ sovereign 
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.  Seminole 
Tribe being a constitutional decision, Congress cannot just 
overturn it.  One unresolved question is whether the Secretary 
of the Interior can issue Class III gaming procedures upon 
being petitioned to do so by a tribe whose lawsuit against a 
state was dismissed on account of sovereign immunity.  Two 
circuit courts have ruled that the Secretary cannot issue such 
regulations. 235   In spite of recommendations by many 
                                                            
230 See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1988); Dep’t of 
Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 61 (1994). For a critical analysis, see Skibine, 
supra note 96, at 428–30. 
231 See Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).  
232 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
233 For a critical analysis of the decision, see Joseph William Singer, Nine-
Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession, and Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 605 (2006). 
234 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
235 See New Mexico v. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2017); Texas 
v. United States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).  For a critique of the Texas 
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scholars, no amendment to IGRA on this issue or others seem 
to be forthcoming. 236 
4. Recognizing Native Hawaiians.  
Although so far, Native Hawaiians lost both Supreme 
Court cases affecting their interests, 237  Congress tried but 
was unable to enact any kind of legislation recognizing Native 
Hawaiians as an indigenous/tribal governmental entity. 238  
However, on September 29, 2015, President Obama’s 
administration, through the Department of the Interior, 
announced that it was amending regulations that had 
prohibited Native Hawaiians to apply for federal recognition 
as an Indian tribe.  The new regulations would allow Native 
Hawaiians to petition the government for recognition as an 
Indian tribe.239  This may moot any further legislative activity 
in this area for some times.        
5. Overturning Carcieri v. Salazar.240  
So far, tribal efforts to enact a Carcieri Fix have been 
unsuccessful.  Under Carcieri, in order to be eligible to receive 
land into trust under Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act, a tribe had to be under federal jurisdiction as of 1934.241  
                                                            
decision, see Skibine, supra note 166, at 293–96. See also Note, A Pretty 
Smart Answer: Justifying the Secretary of Interior’s Seminole Fix for the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 40 AM. IND. L. REV. 325 (2015–2016).  
236 See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 
44 HARV. J. ON LEG. 39 (2007) (Recommending Amendments to IGRA).    
237 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Hawaii v. Office of Haw. Affairs, 
556 U.S. 163 (2009). 
238 For a description of such legislative efforts, see Note, The Akaka Bill: The 
Native Hawaiians Race for Federal Recognition, 23 U. HAWAII L. REV. 857 
(2001).    
239  See Department of the Interior Press Release, Interior Proposes Re-
establishing Government to Government Relationship with Native Hawaiian 
Community, Sept. 29, 2015. 
240 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  
241 For an argument that most if not all Indian Tribes were under federal 
Jurisdiction as of 1934, see William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) 
Jurisdiction, 65 U. KANSAS L. REV. 415 (2016). 
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It should be noted, however, that Indian Nations may not be 
united in the effort to overturn the decision. 242 
6. Repealing Section 5 of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) or declaring it 
unconstitutional. 
On the other hand, in spite of concerted efforts by the 
States to challenge implementation of Section 5 of the IRA,243 
or declare the section unconstitutional, 244  the Court never 
came close to holding the Section unconstitutional. 245  The 
Court did grant cert in Department of the Interior v. South 
Dakota, 246  but proceeded on remanding the case for 
reconsideration to the Secretary of the Interior without 
writing a substantial opinion.  Congress on the other hand, 
did amend the Indian Reorganization Act in 1988 to allow 
tribes that had initially rejected the Act to be able to benefit 
from Section 5.247      
7. Abrogating tribal Sovereign Immunity 
                                                            
242 For background on the issues raised by the taking of land into trust for 
the benefit of Indian tribes pursuant to Section 5, see Note, Beyond the 
Carcieri Fix: The Need for Broader Reform of the Land into Trust Process of 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2011).  
243 For a critique of the implementation of Section 5, see Note, Extreme 
Rubber Stamping: The Fee to Trust Process under the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 251 (2014).  
244 See, e.g., City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
Section 5 has been attacked as being unconstitutional as an overbroad 
delegation of power to the Secretary of the Interior.  It has also been 
attacked as a violation of the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
The Tenth Amendment provides that all powers not delegated to the 
Congress are reserved to the States.   
245 On November 27, 2017, the Supreme Court denied cert to two petitions 
asking the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of Section 5 of the 
IRA, 25 U.S.C. 5108, (formerly cited as 25 U.S.C. 465). See Town of Vernon 
v. United States, Docket No-17-8, and Upstate Citizen for Equality v. United 
States, Docket No. 16-1320).     
246 Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996). 
247 The amendments to Section 5 of the IRA, codified at 25 U.S.C. 2202, were 
contained in Title II of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 96 Stat 2517.   
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In Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies,248 the 
Court strongly implied that Congress should consider 
restricting the scope of tribal sovereign immunity. 249  Yet, 
after considering the issue in connection with enactment of 
the Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts 
Encouragement Act of 2000, 250 Congress opted against any 
major revisions to the doctrine.251  It has to be noted, however, 
that the Court’s unquestioned support for tribal sovereign 
immunity has been waning: From a 6–3 majority in Kiowa 
Tribe in 1998 to a 5–4 decision in the 2014 Bay Mills 
decision. 252  Furthermore, the Court granted cert in Upper 
Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren.253  In that case, the state of 
Washington’s Supreme Court held that the Upper Skagit 
Indian Tribe could not rely on its sovereign immunity in a case 
where Plaintiffs, relying on adverse possession, had filed an 
in rem action against the Tribe asking a court to determine 
                                                            
248 Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998). 
249 Id. at 758 (“There are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the 
doctrine… In our interdependent and mobile society, however, tribal 
immunity extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-
governance. This is evident when tribes take part in the Nation's commerce. 
Tribal enterprises now include ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes 
to non-Indians.  In this economic context, immunity can harm those who are 
unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal 
immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims. 
These considerations might suggest a need to abrogate tribal immunity, at 
least as an overarching rule . . . we defer to the role Congress may wish to 
exercise in this important judgment.”).  For a critical look at statements 
made in the opinion, see William Wood, It was not an accident: The Tribal 
Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM U. L. REV. 1587 (2013). 
250 P.L. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (2000) (amending 25 U.S.C. 81).  See Andrea 
M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a 
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 
711 (2002) (summarizing congressional considerations in amending the law 
of tribal immunity). 
251 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-501 (2000); S. Rep No. 106-150 (1999). See also 
Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity's Penumbras: Common Law, 
“Accident,” and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 
43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 826 (2008) (summarizing the arguments for 
and against the doctrine). 
252 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 124 U.S. 2024 (2014). 
253 Doc. No. 17-387, Petition granted December 8, 2017.  
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title to a disputed parcel of land. 254   The United States 
Supreme Court could arguably just expand on language in one 
of its previous federal Indian law opinion allegedly indicting 
that tribes cannot invoke their sovereign immunity in in rem 
actions.255  It would be somewhat surprising, however, for the 
Court to have granted cert in such a relatively unimportant 
case just to affirm the state court on this narrow ground.          
8. Amending the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA) or declaring it unconstitutional.  
Anti-ICWA interest groups efforts to amend the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 256  have also gone nowhere, 
legislatively speaking.  Although bills to amend ICWA have 
been introduced, so far Congress has not enacted any new 
amendments to this legislation.257  On the same subject, even 
though many have and continue to challenge some sections of 
ICWA as being unconstitutional, 258 the Supreme Court has 
never granted cert to any such cases.259  However, it should be 
noted that in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 260 the Court stated 
that parts of the ICWA would raise equal protection issues if 
                                                            
254 Lundgren v. Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, 389 P.3d 569 (2017). As stated 
by the Supreme Court of Washington: “The Supreme Court held that the 
Indian General Allotment Act allowed Yakima County to impose ad valorem 
taxes on reservation land. The Court reached that conclusion by 
characterizing the county's assertion of jurisdiction over the land as in rem, 
rather than an assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the Yakama 
Nation. In other words, the Court had jurisdiction to tax on the basis of 
alienability of the allotted lands, and not on the basis of jurisdiction over 
tribal owners.” Id. at 573. 
255 See Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 
502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
256 Pub. Law 95-608, codified at 25 U.S.C. sections 1901-1923 (2000). 
257 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints under the Indian Child Welfare 
Act, Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 
587 (2002) (discussing the major controversies regarding ICWA). 
258 For a summary of current cases, see Matthew Newman and Kathryn 
Fort, Legal Challenges to ICWA: An Analysis of Current Case Law, 36 NO.1 
CHILD L. PRAC. 13 (2017). 
259  On October 30, 2017, the Court denied cert to a case raising equal 
protection and due process issues. See S.S. v. Colo. River Indian Tribes, 
Docket No. 17-95, Petition for Cert, filed on July 17, 2017.  
260 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013). 
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the interpretation of the South Carolina Supreme Court was 
upheld.261  
* * * 
Tribal interests have been more adept at preventing 
anti-tribal bills from being enacted into law.  Thus, major 
pieces of pro-tribal legislation like the IRA, IGRA, and ICWA 
have not been amended in ways adverse to tribal interests.  
However, the same thing could be said of anti-tribal interests’ 
capabilities to stymie pro-tribal legislation.  It is telling that 
Congress was able to revisit the Indian Land Consolidation 
Act three times and has made numerous amendments to the 
Indian Self Determination Act, yet tribal legislative efforts to 
fix IGRA in the wake of Seminole Tribe, reaffirm tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-members, or preempt state taxation in 
Indian Country, have all been stalled.  
The record confirms that it is much easier to kill rather 
than enact legislation. 262   Many have written about 
congressional gridlock and the Court is, of course, aware of 
this phenomenon.263  The next section of this Article argues 
that this awareness has emboldened the Court to use judge-
made law to promote its own agenda and policies in Indian 
Country without any fears of upsetting any equilibrium that 
could or should have been reached with Congress.   
D. Looking for A Different Kind of Equilibrium 
Through the Use of Federal Common Law.  
As stated earlier, the Court uses federal common law 
more than any other type of law in its Indian law 
jurisprudence. 264  Moreover, the Court’s most active use of 
federal common law is to protect non-members from tribal 
jurisdiction and promote state jurisdiction inside Indian 
                                                            
261 Id. at 2565.  
262  See William N. Eskridge, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1441 (2008).  
263 See Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of 
Power, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 1097 (2013); Michael, J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock 
Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2013); Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, 
Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2217 (2013).  
264 See discussion, supra notes 89–104.  
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reservations.  This section posits that rather than seeking to 
achieve equilibrium with Congress, the Court is using federal 
common law to impose its own version of what the equilibrium 
between tribal and non-tribal interests should look like.   
The Court’s inordinate reliance on federal common law 
for these purposes shows that the Court does not believe that 
Congress can be counted on to protect the interests of non-
members or states in Indian Country. 265  In a non-federal 
Indian law context, scholars have noted that the Court’s desire 
to protect norms of federalism was based on a belief that 
Congress does not always have the states’ interest foremost in 
mind when enacting legislation.266  Although there is no data 
supporting the ineffectiveness of Congress to look after the 
interests of states and non-members in Indian Country, there 
is legislative gridlock generally speaking. 267   Therefore it 
would not be surprising for the Court to conclude that this 
gridlock may extend to controversial issues in Indian Country.  
This perceived inability or unwillingness of Congress 
to protect the interests of states and non-members has pushed 
the Court to reverse certain common law presumptions that 
used to govern the field of Indian affairs.  For instance, 
Frickey asserted that the Court was undermining tribal 
sovereignty by abandoning the exceptionalism of John 
Marshall’s foundational Indian law cases, 268  and adopting 
instead a new “federal common law” for what he called, “our 
age of colonialism.” 269  In the Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, first published in 1942, Felix Cohen articulated the 
generally accepted paradigm defining the powers of Indian 
tribes before 1978.270  There, he wrote: 
 
                                                            
265 As stated by the late Philip Frickey: “it seems plain that the trend has 
been motivated by a judicial sense that Congress has failed to step in and 
fix a myriad of festering local problems by eliminating tribal authority.” 
Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 433, 460–61. (2005). 
266 See Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
80 (2001).   
267 See discussion, supra note 257. 
268 See Frickey, Native American Exceptionalism, supra note 265.   
269 Frickey, Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 26.  
270 Cohen, supra note 9.  
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The whole course of judicial decisions on the 
nature of Indian tribal powers is marked by 
adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) 
An Indian tribe possesses . . . all the powers of 
any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the 
tribe subject to the legislative power of the 
United States and, in substance, terminates the 
external powers of sovereignty of the tribe . . . 
but does not by itself affect the internal 
sovereignty of the tribe, i.e. its powers of local 
self- government. (3) These powers are subject 
to quantification by treaties and by express 
legislation of Congress.271 
I have argued elsewhere that during the Rehnquist years, the 
Court adopted a “dependency” paradigm for the incorporation 
of tribes into the federalist system. 272   Under that paradigm, 
tribes were not being incorporated under a third sphere of 
sovereignty but were “dependent” on Congress for all their 
political rights.   In other words, the Court’s jurisprudence was 
evolving towards a position that would require the existence 
of tribal power to be somehow confirmed in treaties or 
legislation.273  In addition, the Court was moving towards a 
position requiring congressional intent to preempt state 
jurisdiction in Indian country to be clearly indicated.274  Thus, 
instead of looking for Congress to act affirmatively to protect 
states and non-member interests, the Court was putting the 
burden on Congress to confirm tribal power and clearly 
establish its intent to pre-empt state jurisdiction in Indian 
Country.  
Although Congress has adopted broad policies favoring 
tribal self-government, the Court’s effort to impose its own 
agenda through federal common law has been facilitated by 
the fact that Congress has rarely addressed general conflicts 
involving tribal and state claims to power on Indian 
                                                            
271 Id. at 132 (internal citation omitted). 
272 See Skibine, Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, supra note 17.  
273 Id. at 668. 
274 Id. 
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reservations.275  This lack of precise congressional direction on 
state taxation and tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members 
has enabled the Court, through the use of formalism, to 
formulate rigid rules from old cases in order to justify its 
decisions favoring States rights and disallowing tribal 
jurisdiction over non-members. 276   The typical formalist 
analysis uses a “rule” derived from authoritative text.  
Functionalism, on the other hand, applies “standards” to 
resolve a given conflict.277  The use of formalism instead of 
functionalism has enabled the Court to hide its policy choices 
behind such rigid rules.  Using a functional approach in 
federal Indian law would at least force the Court to explain 
why its holdings are congruent with current congressional 
policies.278 
The Court’s decision in United States v. Lara was an 
important milestone. 279   Because it held that the Court’s 
decisions implicitly divesting Indian tribes of sovereignty 
could be legislatively overturned, Lara enabled Congress to 
reassert its primary role in governing Indian affairs.280  As 
shown in the previous section, however, the Court also knows 
that the chances of Congress reacting to anti-tribal decisions 
favoring States’ rights or the right of powerful non-tribal 
interests, are extremely small.  Therefore, the Court must feel 
it can use federal common law to divest tribes of jurisdiction 
over non-members and allow state tax jurisdiction in Indian 
Country without the fear of being rebuffed by Congress.   
                                                            
275 The most notable recent exception is the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
of 1988. See discussion, supra notes 160–165. 
276 See Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy, supra note 96.   
277 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Relationship Between Formalism and 
Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 21 
(1998).   
278 Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy, supra note 96, at 395.  
279 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  
280  As I argued elsewhere, Lara also modified the Implicit divestiture 
doctrine enunciated in Oliphant and Montana when the Court stated that 
Indian tribes implicit loss of inherent powers was due to “restrictions… that 
the political branches had imposed on the tribes' exercise of inherent… 
power.” 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). See Alex Tallchief Skibine. 
Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of 
Indian Tribes, 39 AM. IND. L . REV. 77, 83–85 (2014–15). 
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This Article takes no issue with the right of the Court 
to use federal common law, however the more difficult 
question is whether the Court’s formulation of its common law 
rules is legitimate.  Although there are very few limits, if any, 
on the power of federal courts to devise rules of federal 
common law,281 the fashioning of rules of decision should be, 
in one way or another, tied either to congressional policies,282 
or to values emanating from the Constitution.283  As the Court 
noted, statutes establish policies that:  
 
become itself a part of our law, to be given its 
appropriate weight not only in matters of 
statutory construction but also in those of 
decisional law…This appreciation of the 
broader role played by legislation in the 
development of the law reflects the practices of 
common law courts from the most ancient 
times.  As Professor Landis has said “much of 
what is ordinarily regarded as ‘common law’ 
finds its sources in legislative enactment.284 
Commenting on the Court’s use of federal common Law, 
Frickey once stated that the “unstated assumption” 
underlying these federal common law cases was that even 
though Congress has not spoken on the issues being decided, 
the Court is presuming that it is merely following the “wishes 
                                                            
281 See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989) 
(“I take it then that there are no fundamental constraints on the fashioning 
of federal rules of decision.”) 
282 See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 15, at 168–82 (advocating 
a “consistent-with federal-policy” test for deciding some federal Common 
law Indian cases such as cases divesting tribes of sovereignty and cases 
enlarging state jurisdiction in Indian Country).   
283  See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A structural 
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 124 (1996)(arguing that courts should 
be able to make rules of federal common law only if they are directly implied 
from the constitutional structure or if they are necessary to further a basic 
structure of the constitutional scheme).  
284  Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390–91, 393 (1970) 
(quoting James Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law,” Harvard Legal 
Essays, 213–14 (1934)). 
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of Congress.”285  Frickey concluded, however, that there was 
no evidence supporting such a judicial presumption.286  Other 
scholars have noted that when it comes to federal Indian 
common law, the decisional law is divorced from current 
congressional policies.287  As stated by Frank Pommersheim, 
“[i]n a sense, the Court has become the ultimate organ for 
formulating Indian policy in contemporary law.  This raises a 
quintessential separation of powers issue, with the Court 
usurping the constitutional role of Congress to make law and 
formulate policy.”288  Some scholars have agreed.289  Others 
have argued that whether Indian nations have maintained 
sovereign powers over non-members should be treated as a 
political question.290  
Native Americans have been described at various 
times as the “forgotten Americans,” or the “vanishing 
Indians.”291  There was a time when almost all Indian tribes 
were economically powerless and had very little or no impact 
on the political and economic life of the United States.   These 
times are over: whether it is because of the success of Indian 
casino gaming, 292  or other aspects of tribal economic 
development, 293  Indian issues are no longer on the 
                                                            
285 Frickey, Our Age of Colonialism, supra note 26, at 7.  
286 Id. 
287  See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra note 15.  
288  Frank Pommersheim, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS TRIBES, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 229 (2009).  
289 See Lance Sorenson, Tribal Sovereignty and the Recognition Power (Nov. 
6, 2017), available at SSRN.com/abstract=3066221. (suggesting that the 
Court’s use of Federal Common Law to find implicit divestiture of tribal 
sovereignty is unconstitutional as a violation of the Separation of Power 
principle.)   
290 See Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty 
in Indian Affairs, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 666 (2016).   
291 See Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns, supra note 13. 
292  See generally, Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 
supra note 166.  
293 On tribal economic development, see Robert J. Miller, American Indian 
Entrepreneurs: Unique Challenges. Unlimited Potential, 40 ARIZ. SR. L. J. 
1297 (2008); W Greg Guedel & J.D. Colbert, Capital Inequality, and Self 
Determination: Creating a Sovereign Financial System for Native American 
Nations, 41 AM. IND. L. REV. 1 (2016).  
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backburner.294  How Indian tribes conduct their politics and 
handle their business affairs matters to the non-Indian 
world.295  Because of this new reality, the Court has been in 
the process of re-adjusting the legal landscape.296  In looking 
for an equilibrium between tribal and non-tribal interests, the 
Court may be adjusting the rules to ensure that what it 
(subjectively) considers a level playing field between the 
Tribes and the states, is achieved.  Controversial decisions in 
cases such as City of Sherrill and Plains Commerce Bank may 
reflect a knee jerk reaction to the Tribes’ newfound political 
and economic power.297   
A good example of the Court’s desire to create a new 
level playing field is its recent decision in Lewis v. Clarke. 298  
In that case, the Court refused to extend the Tribe’s sovereign 
immunity to a tribal employee alleged to have committed a 
tort while driving a tribal vehicle off the reservation but still 
within the scope of his employment. 299   In coming to its 
decision, the Court took into account whether similar state 
employees would have enjoyed the State’s sovereign immunity 
in such situations.  After summarizing the rules denying 
extension of state sovereign immunity in such circumstances, 
the Court stated, “There is no reason to depart from these 
                                                            
294  See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribal Business & the Off-
Reservation Market, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047 (2008).  
295 See Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 
(2007) (explaining why it is now more important for tribal governments to 
adopt good governmental practices and why tribal government should use 
traditional forms of governance even if those are not similar to American 
style governance).  
296 See Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 23. 
297 See discussion, supra notes 215–227.  
298 Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017). 
299  Id. at 1291 (“It is apparent that these general principles foreclose 
Clarke's sovereign immunity defense in this case. This is a negligence action 
arising from a tort committed by Clarke on an interstate highway within 
the State of Connecticut. The suit is brought against a tribal employee 
operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment but on state lands, 
and the judgment will not operate against the Tribe. This is not a suit 
against Clarke in his official capacity. It is simply a suit against Clarke to 
recover for his personal actions, which “will not require action by the 
sovereign or disturb the sovereign's property.”).  
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general rules in the context of tribal sovereign immunity.”300  
That case indicates that from now on, Indian nations should 
be very judicious when invoking sovereign immunity.301  The 
more powerful the interests being affected by the use of tribal 
immunity are, the more likely there is to be a response from 
Congress.  The recent transfer of patents from Allergan to the 
St. Regis Mohawk tribe in the hope of shielding such patents 
from judicial scrutiny provides a good example.302  Legislation 
was promptly introduced in Congress purporting to abrogate 
tribal sovereign immunity in such cases. 303  Whether such 
legislation moves forward remains to be seen.304  But if I am 
correct about how the Court behaves when faced with 
congressional gridlock or inaction and the issue is important 
enough to the Court, it will intervene and act decisively in a 
manner that may not be positive for tribal interests.305 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s continued reliance on doctrines of federal 
common law to divest tribes of sovereignty or allow state 
jurisdiction in Indian Country is unfortunate and undermines 
congressional policies favoring tribal self-government and 
economic self-sufficiency.  However, there are reasons for 
tribes to be somewhat optimistic.  Congressional response to 
                                                            
300 Id. at 1290–91.  
301 See Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Rights Without Remedies, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIBERTIES 236, 254–56 (2017) (Examining the more controversial use of 
Tribal Sovereign Immunity and cautioning that more unexpected or 
innovative use of the doctrine may generate a congressional response.)  
302 See Mylan Pharm. v. St. Regis Mohawk, decision of the Patent Trial & 
Appeal Board (Feb. 23, 2018).    
303 See S. 1948, introduced by United States Senator Claire McCaskill on 
October 10, 2017.  
304 The Patent & Appeal Board refused to recognize the tribal immunity in 
this case. Whether the legislation moves forward will probably depend on 
whether that decision is overturned on appeal.    
305 Another controversial issue that may generate a judicial reaction from 
the Court has been the use of tribal sovereign immunity to protect payday 
lenders from judicial scrutiny.  See Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, 
The Alliance Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both Tribal 
Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 
778–84 (2012). 
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the Supreme Court’s Indian law jurisprudence, while not 
overly active, has not been detrimental to tribal interests.  
Although enacting pro Indian pan-tribal legislation, such as 
the Indian Child Welfare Act or the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, is definitely harder than it used to be, 306 
individual tribes have continued to be successful in enacting 
tribal specific legislation.307  Moreover, the overall percentage 
of tribal wins in the last thirty years while not great (28%), 
has increased with each decade.308   
In conclusion, the overall trend in the cases does 
indicate that the Court is now more willing to accept the 
position of Indian nations as the Third Sovereign within our 
federalist system.  In a recent Supreme Court decision 
discussing the inherent sovereignty of Puerto Rico, Justice 
Kagan, writing for the Court, compared such sovereignty to 
the sovereignty of Indian nations and stated  
 
Originally, this Court has noted “the tribes 
were self-governing sovereign political 
communities possessing,” (among other 
capacities) the “inherent power to prescribe 
laws their members and to punish infractions of 
those laws.”. . .  After the formation of the 
United States, the tribes became “domestic 
dependent nations,” subject to the plenary 
control of Congress. . . But unless and until 
Congress withdraws a tribal power—including 
                                                            
306 On suggesting strategies to enact pan-tribal legislation supporting tribal 
self-determination, see Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at 
the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777 (2006).  
307 See Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra note 28, at 87 (“Congress’s 
enactment rate for Indian-related legislation was higher than its enactment 
rate for legislation more generally during the time period studied. This 
higher enactment rate has important implications for how we understand 
Congress as a policymaker, its relationship with Indians, and the 
formulation of federal Indian law and policy.”). 
308 See discussion, supra notes 145–149. 
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the power to prosecute—the Indian community 
retains that authority in its earliest form.309   
This language is in line with the paradigm articulated by Felix 
Cohen under which Indian nations have retained all their 
inherent sovereignty except to the extent that such 
sovereignty has been given up in treaties or specifically taken 
away by congressional legislation.310  It is also consistent with 
the implicit divestiture doctrine as arguably re-conceptualized 
by Justice Breyer in United States v. Lara, where the Court 
took the position that previous court decisions, that had 
implicitly divested tribes of some inherent powers, only did so 
because of the “restrictions . . . that the political branches had 
imposed on the tribes' exercise of inherent . . . power.”311  It is 
not consistent, however, with the implicit divestiture doctrine 
as conceptualized in Oliphant or Montana, where tribes had 
some of their sovereign powers implicitly divested upon 
incorporation into the United States because these powers 
were either inconsistent with the sovereign interests of the 
United States or subjectively deemed not necessary to tribal 
self-government.312 
V. APPENDIX A 
Key:  
Type of Law Used (TLU): Federal Common Law = FCL; 
Statutory/Treaty interpretation = STI; Common 
Law/Statutory = CLS; Constitutional Law = Con.; Common 
law = Com.; Statutory = Stat.; Procedural = Proc.; Statutory 
Interpretation = SI; Treaty Interpretation = TI 
Substantive Rights Affected (SRA): Sovereign Rights = 
Sov.; Economic Rights = Econ.; Property Rights = Prop.; 
                                                            
309 Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016) (holding that 
for the purposes of the double jeopardy clause, Puerto Rico did not have any 
inherent sovereignty separate from that of the United States.)  Although 
there were two dissenters, only Justice Thomas objected to the quoted 
language. Id. at 1877.  
310 See discussion, supra notes 263–264. 
311 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).  See discussion, supra 
notes 272–273.  
312 See discussion, supra notes 272–283. 
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Trusts Doctrine = Tru.; Cultural/Religious = C/R; 
Sovereign/Political = Sov./ Pol.;  
Win/Loss = W/L 
Cases Citation W/L TLU SRA 
Iowa Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. 
LaPlante 480 U.S. 9 (1987) Win FCL Sov. 
Amoco 
Production v. 
Gambell 480 U.S. 531 (1987) Loss STI Econ. 
Hodel v. Irving 481 U.S. 704 (1987) Loss Con. Econ. 
United States 
v. Cherokee 
Nation 480 U.S. 700 (1987) Loss Con. Econ. 
California v. 





Cemetery Ass. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) Loss Con. C/R 
Oklahoma Tax 
Comm. v. 












New Mexico 490 U.S. 163 (1989) Loss FCL 
Sov./ 
Pol. 













Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990) Loss Con. C/R 



















Comm. v. Sac 








Samuels  507 U.S. 99 (1993) Loss STI 
Sov./ 
Pol. 
Lincoln v. Vigil 508 U.S. 182 (1993) Loss Proc. N/A 














v. Florida 517 U.S. 44 (1996) Loss Con. 
Sov./ 
Pol. 
Strate v. A-1 




Youpee 519 U.S. 234 (1997) Loss Con. Econ. 
Idaho v. Coeur 





Venetie 522 U.S. 520 (1998) Loss SI 
Sov./ 
Pol. 
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Cass County v. 
Leech Lake 









Crow Tribe 523 U.S. 696 (1998) Loss Com. 
Sov./ 
Pol. 
Kiowa Tribe v. 
Manufacturing 




of Revenue v. 










Natural Gas v. 




Production v.  
Southern Ute 






Users 532 U.S. 1 (2000) Loss Com. Tru. 
Rice v. 
Cayetano 528 U.S. 495 (2000) Loss Con. Pol. 
Arizona v. 
California 530 U.S. 392 (2000) Win Proc. Prop. 
Chickasaw 
Nation v. 
United States 534 U.S. 84 (2001) Loss Stat. Econ. 
Nevada v. 
Hicks 533 U.S. 353 (2001) Loss Com. Sov.  





Potawatomi 532 U.S. 422 (2001) Loss Com. Sov.  
Atkinson 
Trading v. 




United States 533 U.S 262 (2001) Win Stat. Prop. 
Inyo County v. 
Paiute 
Shoshone 
Indians 538 U.S. 701 (2003) Loss Stat. Sov. 
United States 
v. Navajo 




Apache 537 U.S. 465 (2003) Win Com. Tru. 
United States 
v. Lara 541 U.S. 193 (2004) Win Con. 
Sov./ 
Pol. 
City of Sherrill 
v. Oneida 















Bank v. Long 






Affairs 556 U.S. 163 (2009) Loss Stat. Prop. 
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United States 
v. Navajo 
Nation II 556 U.S. 287 (2009) Loss Com. Tru. 
Carcieri v. 
Salazar 555 U.S. 379 (2009) Loss Stat. Sov. 
United States 
v. Jicarilla 
Apache Nation 564 U.S. 162 (2011) Loss Com. Tru. 
United States 
v. Tohono 
O'Odham 563 U.S. 307 (2011) Loss Proc. Tru. 
Salazar v. 
Ramah Navajo 
132 S. Ct. 2181 






Patchack 567 U.S. 209 (2012) Loss Stat. Tru. 
Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby 
Girl 
133 S. Ct. 2552 







124 U.S. 2024 





136 S. Ct. 1072 





136 S. Ct. 1954 





136 S. Ct. 750 







136 S. Ct. 2159 
(2016) Win Com. 
Sov./ 
Pol. 
Lewis v. Clark 
137 S. Ct. 1285 
(2017) Loss Com. 
Sov./ 
Pol. 
Matal v. Tam  
137 S. Ct. 1744 
(2017) Loss Con. C/R 
 
